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From 1989 to 1994, defendant Amanda Mitchell participated in
a drug conspiracy ring that eventually resulted in a twenty-three person indictment by a federal grand jury. See United States v. Mitchell,
122 F.3d 185, 186 (3d Cir. 1997). The indictment charged Mitchell
with several counts of conspiring to distribute at least five kilograms
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. If convicted, depending
on the quantity of cocaine Mitchell was found to have distributed,
she faced a sentencing range of ten years to life imprisonment.
Aware of this range of sentencing possibilities, Mitchell pled
guilty to the distribution charges before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In her guilty plea,
however, Mitchell specifically reserved, with the trial judge's agreement, the right to contest the amount of cocaine at issue. At the
plea hearing, the district court judge and the Assistant United States
Attorney set forth the range of possible sentences to which Mitchell
might be subject under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Mitchell was reminded by the court that as long as the prosecution
demonstrated that she distributed at least five kilograms of cocaine,
she faced a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison and six years
of supervised release. See id. at 186-87.
Upon finding a factual basis for Mitchell's plea, the judge explained to her that by pleading guilty, she was waiving several constitutional rights including her right to avoid self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 187. Once the court was
confident that Mitchell understood the consequences of her guilty
plea, the district judge accepted her plea. Mitchell's sentencing
hearing followed the trial of his coconspirators and was conducted
on July 2, 1996. At this hearing, several of Mitchell's coconspirators
testified as to how much cocaine Mitchell distributed from 1989
through 1994. Three prosecution witnesses testified that Mitchell
684
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sold one and a half to two ounces of cocaine several times a week
over a two year period. Although Mitchell's attorney cross-examined
these witnesses, Mitchell did not testify or offer any evidence to refute the prosecution's case. See id. at 188.
After all of the evidence had been presented, the district court
judge reasoned that because Mitchell had pled guilty to the charge
of distribution of cocaine, she did not retain the right to remain silent during her sentencing hearing. The trial judge considered
Mitchell's failure to testify as evidence against her because her guilty
plea had constituted a waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege.
Finding the prosecution's witnesses credible and considering
Mitchell's failure to testify, the court found that Mitchell had distributed more than five kilograms of cocaine and sentenced her to
the mandatory minimum penalty of ten years in prison. Mitchell
subsequently appealed district court decision, asserting that the
court's consideration of her refusal to testify violated her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a defendant convicted of a crime does not retain
her Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify during her sentencing
hearing with respect to the elements of the crime for which she has
already been convicted. See id. at 191. The appellate court therefore
held that because Mitchell pled guilty and did not assert that her testimony during sentencing may have implicated her in another federal or state offense, she was no longer protected under the Fifth
Amendment privilege even though her failure to testify may have
enhanced her sentence. See id.
In a brief opinion authored by Chief Judge Sloviter, the Third
Circuit recognized that the Fifth Amendment not only provides a
criminal defendant with the privilege not to testify, but also precludes the trier of fact from considering the defendant's assertion of
the privilege as evidence against her. See id. at 189 (citing Minnesota
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984)). The court further explained,
however, that if the defendant's testimony cannot incriminate her
because she has already been convicted of the questioned offense,
the Fifth Amendment privilege does not provide any protection. See
id. (citing Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513 (1960)). Once the
defendant pleads guilty to an offense or is convicted by a jury, Chief
Judge Sloviter pointed out that the privilege cannot be asserted during sentencing with respect to acts constituting that offense. See id.
The majority next addressed three Third Circuit cases cited by
Mitchell as support for the argument that she retained her Fifth

686

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:684

Amendment privilege during sentencing. See id. Chief Judge
Sloviter noted that in these cases, the Third Circuit permitted convicted defendants to invoke their Fifth Amendment privileges during
sentencing. See id. Moreover, the chief judge observed, the court
also held that the defendants retained their Fifth Amendment privilege during sentencing despite the fact that they had already been
convicted of the underlying offense. See id. at 189-90 (citing United
States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Heube,
864 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d
Cir. 1976)). Based on the holdings in these cases, the court explained, Mitchell argued that a convicted defendant could not be
required to testify during her sentencing if such testimony could affect the level of her sentence. See id. at 190. In rejecting Mitchell's
argument, ChiefJudge Sloviter explained that Garcia,Heube, and Frierson all supported Fifth Amendment principles. See id. After discussing the implications of the Third Circuit's decisions in Garcia
and Frierson, the chief judge specifically rejected the argument that
the Fifth Amendment privilege is always retained after conviction
and until sentencing is completed. See id. The appellate court stated
that this line of cases recognized a Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent during sentencing only if the defendant's testimony could subject him to the risk of being convicted of another crime. See id.
Next, Chief Judge Sloviter rejected the broad and sweeping approach taken by several federal courts of appeals in recognizing a
general rule permitting the defendant to assert his Fifth Amendment
rights during sentencing. See id. at 190, 191. Rather, the chief judge
held that the Fifth Amendment does not extend protection during
sentencing where the defendant is questioned solely about acts for
which he has already been convicted, even if his testimony may be
used to enhance his sentence. See id. at 191 (citing Frierson, 945 F.2d
at 656 n.2). The appellate court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has been construed only to provide protection if the defendant's testimony may affect his conviction
for the crime. See id. The Third Circuit explained that the concerns
underlying the testimonial privilege are not implicated once the defendant has been convicted because the sentencing process does not
affect the defendant's conviction. See id.
The appellate court then found it irrelevant that the defendant
never admitted to distributing a specified amount of cocaine at her
plea hearing. See id. The court explained that Mitchell was deemed
convicted of the offense when she pled guilty to the charge of distributing cocaine and she thereby voluntarily waived her Fifth
Amendment rights with respect to that offense. See id. Although the
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amount of drugs Mitchell distributed had not yet been determined,
this factual issue was not an element of the offense but merely affected the level of her sentence under the guidelines. See id. Chief
Judge Sloviter therefore held that because Mitchell pled guilty and
did not allege that her testimony may have implicated her in another
federal or state offense, she was no longer protected under the Fifth
Amendment privilege at her sentencing hearing. See id.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Michel refused to adopt the
court's categorical approach to Fifth Amendment waivers resulting
from criminal convictions. See id. at 192. Although the judge accepted the general proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege
is waived upon conviction, the concurrence questioned whether such
a rule should apply when the defendant specifically reserves the right
to challenge a sentencing factor not deemed an element of the offense, regardless of whether the testimony may implicate the defendant in another crime. See it.
Despite disagreeing with the court's reasoning, Judge Michel asserted that Mitchell's sentence was valid even though it may have
been an error for the trial judge to consider Mitchell's assertion of
her Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify as evidence against her.
See id Considering the amount of evidence against the defendant,
the judge explained that the district court would have reached the
same conclusion regarding the amount of drugs distributed, even if
the defendant's assertion of the Fifth Amendment were not held
against her. See id. Therefore, because the trial judge's decision was
harmless error, the concurrence declared that it was unnecessary to
decide the constitutional issue in light of the disagreement among
the several circuits. See i&.
The court's decision in Mitchell was properly based on the
clearly settled principle of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence holding
that the testimonial privilege ceases to exist once the possibility of
prosecution has faded. The defendant in this case failed to provide
any support for her proposition that the privilege should exist after
conviction if a factual element bearing on her sentence remains contested. In a system that utilizes complex and fact-specific sentencing
guidelines, the court is safe in adhering to the long-standing, categorical distinction between the trial and penalty phases in determining when the Fifth Amendment no longer provides defendants with
the protection against self-incrimination. Until the Supreme Court
is willing to recognize that the federal sentencing guidelines have
more of an impact on criminal defendants than the actual conviction
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itself, the Third Circuit's approach to the Fifth Amendment privilege
is right on target.
Vincent Lodato

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VOTING RIGHTS-A SCHOOL DISTRICT'S
AT-LARGE METHOD OF ELECTING SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS DOES
NOT DEPRIVE MINORITY VOTERS OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO
ELECT THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES AND DOES NOT VIOLATE § 2 OF

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT-Jenkins v. Manning, 116 F.3d 685 (3d Cir.
1997).
The Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Education
in Delaware established an electoral system classified as a multimember or an at-large district system. See Jenkins v. Manning, 116
F.3d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). Each member of the school board is
elected for a term of five years, and the elections are staggered to ensure that one is held annually. See id. at 688. A potential candidate
must live in the district in order to run for that district's seat, although all Red Clay voters are allowed to vote for each seat. See id. at
689. Voters are permitted to vote for a single candidate in each of
the seven nominating districts. The candidate in each of the districts
who receives a plurality of votes is declared the winner. In sum, despite allowing for representation on the school board from each of
the nominating districts, the board accomplishes the task of electing
its members through at-large voting.
The appellants filed a class action suit representing all eligible
black voters within the school district. See id. at 688. The lawsuit alleged that the at-large voting method, in contravention of § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, unlawfully weakened the voting strength of African-American citizens and effectively afforded those citizens less opportunity than the white citizens to partake in the school board's
electoral process. See id.
After conducting a bench trial, the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware concluded that the appellants failed to
establish the existence of legally relevant white-bloc voting, one of
the three factors necessary to obtain relief under the Thornburg v.
Gingles analysis. See id. at 689 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986)). In addition to analyzing the at-large system under Gingles,
the district court also examined the system based upon the totality of
the circumstances. See id. The trial court subsequently found that
even if the appellants had established the existence of the three es-
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sential Gingles factors, they failed to prove a § 2 violation under a totality of the circumstances analysis. See id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. See
id. The appellate court found that the district court mistakenly assessed the effects of the white-bloc voting. See id. In addition, the
Third Circuit stated that the district court incorrectly based its assessment of the white-bloc voting on the potential, as opposed to the
actual, effects of the plurality voting on the opportunity of AfricanAmerican voters to elect their preferred candidates. See id.
On remand, the district court held that although the appellants
established the existence of the three threshold factors under Gingles, they nonetheless failed to establish a § 2 violation under a totality of the circumstances analysis. See id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit declared that despite the existence
of racially polarized voting, no § 2 violation existed because there
had been substantial electoral success for minorities. See id. at 700.
Moreover, the appellate court opined that switching to a singlemember electoral system would not appreciably enhance the likelihood of such success. See id. The court noted that this case was unusual in that the appellants had successfully established the existence
of the three threshold Gingles factors, yet ultimately failed to prove a
Voting Rights Act violation under a totality of the circumstances
analysis. See id.
Writing for the court, Judge Greenberg commenced the analysis
by restating that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the abridgement or denial of the right of any United States citizen to vote based
on color or race. See id. at 689 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)). The
judge further noted that a plaintiff can establish a violation of the
Act by proving that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the
political processes of nomination or election in a state or its political
subdivision are not open on equal terms to members of a protected
class under the Act. See id. at 689-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
In other words, the court continued, a plaintiff claiming a violation
must show that members of the protected class have less of an opportunity to participate in the election process and elect their own
candidates. See id. at 690 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
Judge Greenberg next explained that the essence of a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is that "a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives." Id. (quoting Gingles,
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478 U.S. at 47). The court added that in the legislative history to the
Voting Rights Act, the United States Senate enumerated a number of
factors that could be probative in evaluating claims brought under §
2. See id. (citing 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07 (Senate Report)). Although there exists no requisite number of factors necessary to establish a violation, the Third Circuit remarked that the issue of
whether the political processes at work are equally open requires a
practical and searching evaluation of past and present realities. See
id.
The Third Circuit then noted that a plaintiff must establish
three threshold elements, the Gingles factors, prior to demonstrating
that minority voters were denied the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in contravention of § 2. See id. Judge Greenberg
stated that a plaintiff must first show that the minority group is both
sufficiently geographically compact and large to make up a majority
within a single-member district. See id. Next, the judge explained
that a plaintiff must establish that the minority group is politically
cohesive. See id. Finally, the court added that a plaintiff must prove
that barring any special circumstances, the white majority votes as a
bloc and usually defeats the minority group's chosen candidate. See
id. at 690-91.
The appellate court further observed that while the Gingles factors are essential to a § 2 violation, they are not sufficient. See id. at
691. The court stated that certain factors listed in the Senate Report
play a determinative role in establishing a violation of § 2. See id.
Specifically, the majority enumerated the two most important factors
in the analysis: (1) the extent that minorities have been elected to
positions in public office; and (2) the extent that voting in elections
is racially polarized. See id. (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15).
Judge Greenberg further added that the United States Supreme
Court has recently held that in addition to the Gingles factors and the
totality of the circumstances test, a court must determine whether a
reasonable alternative exists against which to analyze and measure
the voting practice in question. See id. (citing Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 880 (1994)).
The court next reiterated that the ultimate issue in the present
case was whether black voters were deprived of the equal opportunity
to partake in the political system and elect their preferred candidates. See id. In analyzing this issue, Judge Greenberg focused on
the district court's finding of a legally significant white-bloc voting,
the third of the Gingles factors. See id. The Third Circuit noted,
however, that the district court did not perceive this white-bloc vot-
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ing to be overwhelming. See id. at 692. The court then indicated
that the district court, having found the necessary Gingles prerequisites, also assessed the case under the various Senate Report factors
and ultimately did not find a § 2 violation under the totality of the
circumstances analysis. See id. Judge Greenberg explained that the
issue on appeal was not whether the district court correctly found
the existence of the third Gingles factor, but whether the past electoral success of minority candidates should be accorded significant
weight under the totality of the circumstances. See id.
The court then embarked on an analysis of the district court's
finding of substantial minority electoral success. See id. Judge
Greenberg proceeded to discuss various elections analyzed by the
district court when evaluating minority electoral success. See id. at
693. The court explained that the approach under which these elections were to be evaluated required a close examination of the extent
of minority support for various candidates, particularly for white
candidates, to determine if a specific candidate was in fact minoritypreferred. See id. The Third Circuit then enumerated a number of
inquiries relevant to the determination of whether a white candidate
should be labeled minority-preferred: (1) the extent that the minority community sponsored the candidate, (2) the level of attention
that the candidate paid to minority concerns, (3) the degree that
minorities voted in white-white elections as compared to minority
voter turn-out when a minority candidate ran; and (4) the extent
that minority candidates ran for elected office and the difficulty or
ease with which minority candidates qualified to run. See id. at 69394.
Applying the applicable standards set forth, the Third Circuit
turned to the 1981 election of a minority candidate, Harlan Roberts.
See id. at 694. The court declared that the district court erred for a
number of reasons in according significant weight to Roberts's election in the analysis of minority electoral success. See id. First, Judge
Greenberg noted that the race included the largest number of candidates ever to run for a single seat on the school board. See id. Second, the judge observed that the race was the very first school board
election. See id. Third, the court explained that Roberts was the first
and only candidate to ever win with a plurality. See id. Judge Greenberg then noted that the district court's error was not reversible because despite that the trial court should have accorded less weight to
Roberts's election, a black candidate was victorious and the election
must therefore be counted. See id.
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The court then discussed the 1990 election of Carolece Scotton
and found that the district court correctly discounted this race in
evaluating white-bloc voting because the race was between two black
candidates. See id. Denying appellants' claim that the Scotton race
should also be discounted for purposes of evaluating minority electoral success, the Third Circuit explained that this race between two
black candidates was in fact evidence of the minority community's
ability to field successful candidates. See id.
The court also considered the 1988 reelection of Charles Cavanaugh, a white candidate who defeated a black candidate in 1983.
See id. at 695. Stating that although Cavanaugh had become more
focused on the concerns of the minority community since 1983 and
that there existed no obstacles to involvement by minority candidates
in his 1988 campaignJudge Greenberg hinted that the district court
may have inappropriately characterized this candidate as minoritypreferred because Cavanaugh ran unopposed and there was no evidence of minority support for his campaign. See id. Accordingly, the
court concluded, this race should have been discounted in evaluating minority electoral success. See id. Judge Greenberg added, however, that although the district court's finding was relatively unsubstantiated, it was not clearly erroneous. See id.
Next, the Third Circuit examined the 1989 election of Patricia
Reinbold, a white candidate who defeated another white candidate.
See id. The court noted that the district court found that although
black voter turn-out dropped disproportionately during that year,
such a drop was not attributable to the lack of a minority candidate.
See id. Moreover, Judge Greenberg commented, Reinbold not only
supported issues that concerned the black community, but she was
supported by important minority leaders and other blacks in the
community. See id. The judge therefore determined that the district
court's findings that Reinbold was minority-preferred was not clearly
erroneous. See id. The court asserted that the district court's consideration of this white-white election in evaluating minority electoral success was correct because the candidate who won was truly
preferred by the minority community. See id.
After concluding a discussion of minority electoral success, the
court maintained that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act was not intended
to ensure that minorities elected minorities to office, but was intended to provide equality of opportunity for minorities to elect
their preferred representatives regardless of their race. See id. at 69596. Noting that although a number of black candidates had been
defeated in different elections, at times by white candidates, the
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Third Circuit observed that some black candidates had in fact been
successful. See id. at 696. Additionally, Judge Greenberg commented, minorities had succeeded in electing some of their preferred white candidates in certain elections. See id. Thus, the judge
agreed with the district court's ruling that there existed no proof of a
§ 2 violation because minority electoral success, although not persistent or sustained, had been substantial. See id.
Judge Greenberg next addressed the appellants' claim that the
nominating district residency requirement. created a direct obstacle
to minority candidacies from outside two of the nominating districts.
See id. at 697. The judge noted that, as opposed to the at-large voting
system, the appellants desired to establish a single-member district
system in which each district elected its own school board member.
See id. The court declared that the proposed system would likely
limit minority candidacies to the majority-minority districts; this was
precisely what the appellants claimed occurred in the present system.
See id. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that if the appellants succeeded in establishing the new single-member district system, such a
system would only serve to strengthen and perpetuate the current
system about which appellants complained. See id.
The court next proceeded to examine the use of racial appeals
during the district elections. See id. The Third Circuit held that the
district court's finding that racial appeals were not utilized was not
clearly erroneous. See id. Specifically, Judge Greenberg noted that
the district court properly determined that a flyer warning voters not
to vote for a certain black candidate was not a racial appeal. See id.
The court concluded that although the flyer touched upon an issue
heavily related to racial concerns, the district court did not commit
clear error because the flyer did not mention the race of the candidates. See id.
Judge Greenberg then embarked on an analysis of the totality of
the circumstances, weighing against each other the two most important Senate Report factors in order to evaluate the district court's
findings. See id. at 698. The judge stated that the existence of legally
significant white-bloc voting, albeit not overwhelming, must be compared to the level of minority electoral success. See id. The court asserted that the district court was not required to discount the racially
polarized voting even though the trial court did not find it to be
overwhelming. See id. Thus, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that despite the existence of white-bloc voting, in certain
cases the polarization was not accountable for the defeat of the minority or minority-preferred candidate. See id. In addition, the court
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stated, some white voters may have actually crossed over to vote for
the minority or minority-preferred candidate. See id.
Remarking that the enhanced minority electoral success effectively offset the racially polarized voting under the totality of the circumstances analysis, Judge Greenberg added that a comparison of
minorities' electoral success in the current system with their projected success in the proposed single-member district system was evidence of the substantial level of minority electoral success. See id.
The judge asserted that the proposed single-member district system
would not likely produce greater minority electoral success because
although one new district would see a substantial increase in minority voting population and another would experience a slight increase, blacks living outside of the new districts would often fail in
electing their preferred candidates due to the resulting smaller voting age population. See id. at 699. The Third Circuit also commented that by concentrating minority voters into one district, minority candidates would likely hail from only one district, hence
decreasing minority representation in other districts. See id. Additionally, Judge Greenberg agreed with the district court that the single-member district system might also serve to decrease any incentives for the white candidates in non-minority majority districts to
address the concerns of the minority community. See id. Consequently, the judge declared that the district court was correct in finding that the new proposed system would at best have a minor impact
on the electoral success of the minority population. See id.
The Third Circuit further remarked that because the existence
of racially polarized voting counterbalanced the effect of the minority population's electoral success, the other Senate Report factors
became more significant. See id. Observing that although there had
existed discrimination in Red Clay that lowered minority electoral
participation, the court declared that most of the practices and procedures of the current voting system made the process more accessible to minorities. See id. Additionally, Judge Greenberg explained
that the situation was generally improving, as the electoral success of
minorities increased as well as the school board's responsiveness to
the concerns of minorities. See id. The judge therefore concluded
that despite the racially polarized voting in the Red Clay elections,
the minority population enjoyed substantial electoral success and the
proposed single-member district system would not markedly increase
future minority success. See id. at 700. Accordingly, the Third Circuit
declared that the district court was correct in finding that plaintiffs
failed to establish a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See id.
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Writing for the dissent, Judge Rosenn disagreed with the court's
retreat from its statement in Jenkins I that it would be highly unusual
for a plaintiff to establish successfully the existence of the three Ging/es factors and nonetheless fail to prove a violation of the Voting
Rights Act. See id. (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (citing Jenkins v. Red Clay
ConsoL Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993)). Stating
that the court incorrectly weighed the various Senate Report factors
and that the dissent viewed the minority community's electoral success through a different lens, Judge Rosenn asserted that the district
court's decision should not be affirmed. See id.
Noting that the majority failed to appreciate the scope of the
Voting Rights Act, Judge Rosenn proclaimed that in passing the most
recent amendments to the Act, Congress recognized that at-large voting systems often serve unlawfully to diminish minority participation
by permitting cohesive racial majorities to elect every single candidate, thereby leaving the minority community underrepresented. See
id. at 700-01 (Rosenn,J., dissenting). The dissent added that the objective of § 2 is to prohibit various electoral practices, such as at-large
voting schemes, that effectively dilute the voting strength of racial
minorities. See id. at 701 (Rosenn,J., dissenting).
Judge Rosenn next reminded the court that creating singlemember districts is the primary remedy in cases such as Jenkins I because they virtually ensure minority representation. See id. Claiming
that the court "placed its imprimatur on a system which only by a series of flukes and anomalies has permitted any minority representation at all," the dissent observed that the court misinterpreted both
the will of Congress and the Supreme Court. Id. The dissent buttressed this conclusion by pointing out that the Supreme Court has
ruled that a multi-member districting scheme cannot be upheld
merely because it "'sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority
voters.'" Id. (citation omitted).
The dissent then examined what the court characterized as the
substantial success of the minority candidates and concluded that
such success was not as substantial or undeniable as the court proclaimed. See id. For example, the dissent noted that one of the elections used to support the finding of minority electoral success had
occurred subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit. See id. Judge Rosenn observed that the Supreme Court has warned that success
gained during the pendency of the litigation should be viewed cautiously. See id. (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 76). The dissent further
remarked that ten black candidates ran for office in Red Clay between 1981 and 1991, yet only three were victorious. See id. The dis-
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sent stated, however, that of the three victories, one occurred during
the pendency of the litigation and another after a flyer had been distributed during the morning of the midterm election falsely claiming that the white opponent had dropped out of the race. See id.
Moreover, in discussing the classification of two white candidates as
minority-preferred, Judge Rosenn noted that the court should not
have accorded substantial weight to one of the elections because one
of the two blacks found to be important in that campaign stated that
he supported the candidate solely because he disliked her opponent.
See id. at 702 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The dissent proclaimed that
this was not the same "'minority sponsorship'" envisioned in the
court's earlier instructions for ascertaining whether white candidates
were truly the choice of the minority community. See id.
Judge Rosenn closed by reiterating that the court's decision ensured that minority representation and participation in the electoral
process will continue to be based upon happenstance. See id. The
dissent remarked that this ruling was not only inconsistent with congressional intent, but also inconsistent with the Third Circuit's own
statements that a system that repeatedly results in white-bloc voting
to defeat minority-preferred candidates will rarely escape liability
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See id. The dissent then concluded that the appellants established a violation of the Voting
Rights Act under the totality of the circumstances analysis by establishing the existence of the three Gingles factors and other criteria
that demonstrated less than full minority participation in the political process. See id.
The Third Circuit has determined in Jenkins v. Manning that the
African-American citizens of the Red Clay School District will never
be assured of adequate representation and participation in the electoral process, thus ignoring the intent and scope of the Voting
Rights Act. The court's analysis of the effects of the proposed singlemember district system, as opposed to the current scheme, ignores
the possibility that it might be preferable to ensure at least some
level of minority or minority-preferred representation than to continue gambling with the prospect that a politically cohesive white majority could one day cancel out minority influence altogether.
As the dissent correctly observed, past minority electoral success
in Red Clay was hardly substantial. See id. at 701 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Moreover, it is unfortunate that despite a finding of racially polarized voting as well as the existence of the Gingles factors, the court
nonetheless ignored the existence of past and present racial discrimination and relied on the less than substantial minority electoral
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success to declare that the current at-large system is preferable to
one in which minority-preferred candidates are at least assured of
victory in majority-minority districts. Additionally, while the policy of
broader electoral accountability is noble in theory, a non-minority
preferred candidate can still rely on the support of the cohesive political majority and thus ignore the concerns of the minority community. The correct result in this case would have been to respect
Congress's intent in passing the Voting Rights Act and effectively
emasculate the potential effects of white-bloc voting by allowing the
creation of a single-member district system, thus guaranteeing
somewhat proportional minority-preferred representation in Red
Clay.
Danieij.LaFrance

IMMIGRATION
LAW-POLITCAL ASYLUM-PROSECUTION
OF
REFUGEE UNDER A GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW CAN GIVE RISE TO
PERSECUTION, AND THUS REQUIRE GRANTING THE WITHHOLDING OF
DEPORTATION, IF THE GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW IS ENFORCED
BECAUSE OF THE REFUGEE'S POLITICAL OPINION AND IF THE REFUGEE
CAN ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE FEAR OF PERSECUTION-Fengchu

Changv. INS, 119 F.3d 1055 (3d Cir. 1997).
Prior to leaving China in 1992, Fengchu Chang held a position
as chief engineer of a large state-owned company that employed over
3000 people. See Fengchu Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir.
1997). At the same time, Chang held positions as a senior consultant
for the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics and as a director for a
state research institute. During the normal discharge of his professional responsibilities, Chang became privy to technical secrets concerning state projects. As an additional result of these various positions, Chang traveled outside of China several times.
In 1992, Chang was chosen to head a delegation for a trip to the
United States. The purpose of the trip was to purchase technology
for Chang's company from the Pangborn Corporation (Pangborn),
an American company. A security agent from China instructed
Chang to monitor the seven other delegates on the trip, and to alert
the Chinese Embassy (Embassy) of any suspicious conduct. Shortly
after the delegation arrived in the United States, Chang began to
suspect that a few members of his delegation might wish to remain
in the United States. Chang noticed one delegate making suspicious
phone calls, became suspicious of a second delegate when she began
researching how she could study in America, and learned that a third
delegate had informed Pangborn that he intended to remain in the
United States.
Although Chang was required to convey the delegates' suspicious conduct to the Chinese Embassy, Chang failed to do so because he was uncertain of the delegates' intentions and he feared the
consequences they might suffer at the hands of the Chinese government. See id. at 1058. Another delegate, also suspicious of his
three fellow delegates, demanded that Chang call the Embassy. This
delegate told Chang that he would inform the Chinese government
of Chang's failure to report the suspicious delegates. Chang none699
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theless remained intent on returning to China, even though he
faced risks for not reporting his suspicions.
After Chang confided his suspicions to an employee at Pangborn, company officials arranged a meeting between Chang and
Barry O'Neill. Chang later learned that O'Neill worked for the FBI.
O'Neill asked Chang about his family, work, and whether Chang
knew state secrets. O'Neill then informed Chang that he was in
danger and that his only choice was to apply for political asylum.
O'Neill also stated that an agency in Hong Kong would help Chang's
family leave China. Chang subsequently applied for political asylum
four days before his delegation returned to China. Chang and another delegate remained in the United States.
Two years later, in 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) denied Chang's application for political asylum and
charged him with overstaying on an expired visa. See id. Chang admitted his deportable status, but requested a withholding of deportation and renewed his plea for political asylum. See id. At a hearing in
1995, Chang testified regarding his fear of imprisonment if deported
to China and his concern for his family's safety. See id. Chang also
testified that in conversations with his sister and wife he learned that
the Chinese government had forced his wife to retire, revoked his
passport, and filed his photo with the Ministry of State Security. See
id, The immigration judge nonetheless refused to grant Chang political asylum. See id. The judge stated that in order for the fear of
prosecution to become the fear of persecution, the punishment
must be politically motivated. See id. The judge therefore found that
there existed no political reason for Chang's fears. See id.
Chang appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which refused his request for asylum in early 1996. See id. at 1059.
The BIA proclaimed that Chang failed to establish that a reasonable
person under similar circumstances would fear persecution based on
political opinion, race, social group, nationality, or religion. See id.
The BIA stated that prosecution for violating a law that is generally
applicable does not constitute persecution unless the punishment
imposed is driven by an invidious reason. See id. The BIA found that
because China's security laws apply generally, they could not be imposed against Chang for invidious reasons. See id. Therefore, the
BIA continued, the prosecution feared by Chang did not constitute
persecution under the applicable statutes. See id. The BIA consequently directed Chang to depart the United States, and Chang appealed to the federal judiciary. See id.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the judgment of the BIA. See id. at 1068. The appellate court found that Chang was entitled to a mandatory withholding
of deportation and a discretionary grant of asylum. See id. The
Third Circuit reasoned that prosecution under a generally applicable
law can provide the basis for the withholding of deportation or the
grant of asylum. See id. at 1062. The majority also found that Chang
had demonstrated enough of a likelihood of persecution to qualify
for a mandatory withholding of deportation. See id. at 1068. The
court therefore remanded the case for the Attorney General to determine Chang's application for political asylum. See i&.
Writing for the majority, Judge Roth commenced the discussion
by reviewing the two applicable sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See id. at 1059. The judge stated that the INA
provides the Attorney General with the discretionary power to grant
asylum to anyone qualifying as a "refugee" as defined in section
1101(a) (42) (A) of the Act. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988 &
Supp. 1992)). Under section 1101 (a) (42) (A), the court noted, the
word "refugee" encompasses an individual who cannot or will not return to her country "'because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.'" Id. (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1992)). The court then set
forth that the second applicable section was 243(h) (1). See id. The
Third Circuit explained that this section requires the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of an alien whose freedom or life is
threatened because of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or
membership in a certain social group. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1988 & Supp. 1992)). The court next clarified that a discretionary grant of asylum under section 208(a) requires only a
"'well-founded fear of persecution,'" while a mandatory withholding
of deportation under section 243(h) (1) calls for "'a clear probability"' of threats to the alien's freedom or life. Id.
Next, the majority evaluated the BIA's determination that
Chang's application for deportation was invalid because he feared
prosecution under a generally applicable law. See id. at 1060. The
court opined that as a general rule, one who violates a general law
cannot use fear of prosecution under that law as a basis to establish
persecution. See id. Judge Roth noted, however, that neither the
INA nor the legislative history contains any support for the proposition that the fear of prosecution under a generally applicable law can
never be the basis for the withholding of deportation or the granting
of asylum. See id. The judge stated that the INA contains no excep-
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tion for laws of general application. See id. at 1061. All that the INA
requires, the court observed, is a law based on specific factors and
punishment so extreme that it rises to the level of persecution. See
id.
The court then considered whether Chang's alleged persecution was "'on account of'" his political opinion. See id. at 1062.
Judge Roth noted that Chang refused to comply with the Chinese
law because he did not agree with the way the government would
treat the delegates who defected. See id. The judge emphasized that
Chang's defiance of the Chinese government was a personal risk
taken by Chang because of his disagreement with how the delegates
would be punished. See id. The majority stated that the risks taken
by Chang, and his reasons for taking them, were sufficient to establish that Chang had asserted a political opposition to his government. See id.
The majority next evaluated whether China's motives in enforcing the security laws against Chang were "'on account of'" Chang's
political beliefs. See id. at 1063. The court clarified that an asylumseeker must show that she has been specifically targeted because of
her political beliefs and not that she has been persecuted in a general political sense. See id. The Third Circuit explained that the immigration judge and the BIA gave no consideration to the actual
statute China sought to enforce and what actions China pursued under that statute. See id. Each of these factors, Judge Roth acknowledged, indicated China's motivations regarding this case. See id.
The judge therefore concluded that because of the severe penalties
imposed pursuant to China's security laws, China was specifically motivated to prosecute Chang due to his political beliefs. See id. at 1064.
The Third Circuit further proclaimed that even if China's security laws did not establish the required motive, Chang's position with
the Chinese government compelled the conclusion that the government's motive was at least partially political. See id. at 1065. Judge
Roth reasoned that by choosing Chang to head the delegation, the
Chinese government entrusted him with the duty to limit any unauthorized access his fellow delegates had to other people. See id. By
failing to inform the authorities of this unauthorized contact, the
judge stated, Chang manifested a political opposition to the government. See id. In light of this, the court reasoned, it made sense to
view the enforcement of China's security laws against Chang as being
"'on account of " his political opinions. See id.
Next, the court turned to the evidentiary standard that an asylum-seeker must meet in order to qualify for discretionary asylum
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and for a mandatory withholding of deportation. See id. The majority explained that an individual seeking discretionary asylum under
section 208(a) is required to show that her fears of persecution are
"'well-founded.'" See id. at 1066. Judge Roth commented that Chang
need only demonstrate that he had "a subjective fear of persecution
that is supported by objective evidence that persecution is a reasonable possibility." Id. Under this standard, the court stated, the fear
of persecution can be characterized as "'well-founded'" even if there
is lower than a fifty percent probability of the persecution occurring.
See id.
Alternatively, the judge noted, an individual seeking mandatory
withholding of deportation under section 243(h) must show that her
fears are "'clear[ly] probabl [e].'" See id. The court clarified that for
Chang to satisfy this standard, he would have to show by objective
evidence that it is "'more likely than not'" that he will be persecuted
upon his deportation to China. See id.
Judge Roth then set forth the level to which punishment must
reach before it can constitute persecution. See id. The judge stated
that punishment must be "'extreme conduct'" in order for it to constitute persecution. See id. The majority regarded as relevant China's
treatment of others who violate the country's security laws and the
likelihood that Chang will be punished upon his return to China.
See id. The majority relied on Chang's own testimony in prior proceedings to establish that the punishment he would receive in China
would, in fact, constitute persecution. See id. The court further
noted that Chang testified that if he returned to China he would be
imprisoned and lose his job. See id. The Third Circuit recognized
that Chang introduced evidence that, despite the one-year prison
sentence provided for his crime by Chinese law, he would be subject
to a longer jail term. See id. Judge Roth then emphasized that those
expressing political opposition to the government in China may be
imprisoned and even tortured. See id. at 1067. The judge held that
pursuant to the standard enunciated in Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1240 (3d Cir. 1993), all of these circumstances justified characterizing as persecution Chang's eventual punishment if he returned to
China. See id.
Lastly, the court analyzed the probability that Chang would actually suffer persecution upon his return to China. See id. The majority set forth several reasons why Chang was likely to be persecuted
once he returned. See id. Included among these reasons, the court
noted, was that Chang was a high-ranking official privy to state secrets who had manifested his disloyalty to the Chinese government.
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See id. Judge Roth also acknowledged that the FBI believed Chang to
be in danger. See id. The judge buttressed this notion by stating that
the FBI's concern for Chang's safety was so strong that an FBI agent
accompanied Chang when he met with an immigration officer. See
id. at 1068. Finally, the Third Circuit opined that regardless of
whether Chang actually gave away secret information to the FBI, the
Chinese government probably thought that he did. See id.
Judge Roth concluded by declaring that Chang had shown
enough of a likelihood of persecution to qualify for a mandatory
withholding of deportation. See id. The judge therefore remanded
the case to allow the Attorney General to determine whether Chang
could receive a discretionary grant of asylum. See id.
In a brief dissent, Judge Alito stated that the Third Circuit's
standard for a deportation case such as this was enunciated in Fatin.
See id. (Alito, J., dissenting). The Fatinstandard, the dissent argued,
requires a specific showing of the political opinion held by the asylum-seeker, that the asylum-seeker actually held the opinion, and
that the asylum-seeker would actually be persecuted or that the asylum-seeker had a "'well-founded'" fear of persecution. See id. (citing
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240). Judge Alito stated that both the immigration
judge and the BIA had ample evidence to conclude that Chang did
not fall within the standard needed for a mandatory withholding of
deportation. See id. at 1069 (Alito, J., dissenting). The judge argued
that Chang had never indicated any specific political opinion held by
him and in opposition to the Chinese government. See id. The dissent also found that Chang did not report his fellow delegates because he was unsure about their intentions, not because he disagreed with the punishment they might receive if they were reported.
See id. Judge Alito therefore concluded that Chang's action, or lack
thereof, was not in opposition to Chinese law but merely in furtherance of its accurate enforcement. See id.
The Third Circuit in Chang correctly expanded the protection
afforded political refugees under the American judicial system by allowing persecution to be established by prosecution under a generally applicable law. While the story of Fengchu Chang may not contain the drama of a man standing down the tanks in Tiananmen
Square, the question is the same: To how much protection is the
human spirit entitled? Clearly it makes no sense to allow a country
such as China, which has a clear record of egregious human rights
abuses, to continue its campaign of persecution merely because the
country is cunning enough to promulgate, and utilize, generally applicable laws to punish political dissension. Such a suppression of
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the cry for freedom goes against what little identity our country has
left.
Michael A. Baldassare

TAXATION-DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL-IRS IS ESTOPPED FROM
RELYING ON FORM 872-A THAT RESURFACED AFTER THE IRS LED

TAXPAYER TO BELIEVE IT DID NOT EXIST-Fredericks v. Commissioner,
No. 96-7748, 1997 WL 572206 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 1997).
Taxpayer, Barry I. Fredericks, timely filed a joint tax return for
the year 1977, in which he sought to utilize certain tax-shelter advantages. See Fredericks v. Commissioner, No. 96-7748, 1997 WL 572206, at
*1 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 1997). Despite the standard three-year statute
of limitations imposed on filed tax returns, a taxpayer may agree to
extend the period during which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS
or Service) may assess a tax deficiency by filing either an indefinite
extension, Form 872-A, or a one-year extension, Form 872. In 1980,
still within the standard three-year statutory period, the Service
mailed Fredericks a Form 872-A, which he subsequently signed and
returned to the Manhattan District Director's Office. See id. at *2.
Taxpayers can terminate the authorization derived from a Form 872A by completing a valid termination, Form 872-T, although the Service retains an additional three months thereafter within which to assess a tax deficiency. See id. at *2, *21.
Although it was determined during trial that actual receipt of
Form 872-A occurred in late 1980, the auditor in charge of the taxpayer's case explained to him in early 1981 that Form 872-A was missing. Despite the taxpayer's explanation that he had already completed and returned Form 872-A authorizing an indefinite statutory
extension, the IRS agent requested Fredericks to complete Form 872
so to authorize a one-year extension of the statute. This was accomplished and subsequently requested again on two separate occasions,
effectively prolonging the statute until June 30, 1984. See id. at *3.
Relying upon the fact that the revenue agent expressly told him that
Form 872-A had never been found, the taxpayer arrived at the following conclusions: (1) Form 872-T would not be necessary because the
government claimed that Form 872-A did not exist and (2) the last
Form 872 would expire on June 30, 1984, thereby permanently barring the Service from assessing tax deficiencies for the year 1977.
Nonetheless, eight years later in 1992, the IRS relied upon the newly
found Form 872-A to issue to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency for
$28,361 in taxes and $158,000 in interest. See id. at *1, *3.
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Deciding in favor of the Service, the tax court found that the
government's actions failed to rise to the level of an affirmative misrepresentation. See id. at *4. Further, the lower court did not find a
problem with the lack of evidence regarding the exact date the Service located and began relying on the signed Form 872-A that was
purportedly never received. See id. Moreover, the tax court stressed
the taxpayer's failure to establish the elements of estoppel, reasoning
that at any time Fredericks could have freely terminated the Form
872-A extension by filing a Form 872-T. See id. The tax court therefore upheld the Service's assessment of the tax deficiency, and the
taxpayer filed an appeal. See id.
In reversing the decision of the tax court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the taxpayer
not only proved the conventional estoppel elements, but also demonstrated further unique factors to warrant estopping the IRS from
assessing the 1977 tax deficiency. See id. at *1. Accordingly, the majority held that the government was precluded from relying upon the
indefinite extension form, Form 872-A See id. at *18. The appellate
court therefore determined that upon expiration of the last Form
872 in 1984, the statutory period expired and the Service was estopped from making any assessment in 1992. See id.
Judge Aldisert, author of the majority opinion, first explained
that the court must determine whether the taxpayer successfully satisfied the components of an estoppel claim. See id. at *4. The majority enunciated that a plaintiff attempting to bring an estoppel claim
against the government must establish the following five elements:
(1) an erroneous statement or misleading silence, (2) a false factual
statement, (3) the plaintiff's ignorance of the correct factual circumstances, (4) the plaintiff's detrimental reliance, and (5) the government's affirmative misconduct. See id. at *4, *5. The court stressed
that the purpose of the last element is to achieve a balance between
allowing the government to enforce the laws without fear of future
estoppel actions and allowing citizens to feel a minimal sense of reliability when dealing with the government. See id. at *5. Accordingly,
Judge Aldisert structured the majority's analysis in four steps. See id.
at *6, *10, *13, *15-16. First, the judge noted, the court must determine whether there where any misrepresentations, including any affirmative misconduct, by the IRS. See id. at *6. Second, the judge
observed, the court must consider whether reliance on the part of
the taxpayer existed. See id. at *10. Third, the majority explained
the need to address whether the taxpayer relied to his detriment. See
id. at *13. Fourth, Judge Aldisert remarked that the court must
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evaluate the impact on governmental revenues if the government is
estopped from assessing the tax deficiency. See id. at *15, *16.
The Third Circuit commenced the examination of the misrepresentation element by highlighting both the taxpayer's and the
IRS's arguments, as well as restating the tax court's findings-and reasoning. See id. at *6. Judge Aldisert recognized the existence of reversible error because of the tax court's focus on the taxpayer's conduct, rather than that of the Service. See id. The judge noted that
the lower court relied primarily on its assertion that Fredericks at any
time could have executed a valid Form 872-T, thereby canceling the
original indefinite extension. See id. The majority, however, commented that acceptance of the lower court's reasoning would defy
logic because it "would require taxpayers to venture into an Alice in
Wonderland of hypotheticals with the IRS." Id. The court declared
that no taxpayer should be required to execute a termination form
to revoke an indefinite extension that the government firmly declares does not exist. See id.
In distinguishing the applicable cases on point, Judge Aldisert
explained that the IRS did more than give the taxpayer incorrect
oral advice; the Service on three subsequent occasions, which
spanned three separate tax years, requested that the taxpayer execute one-year statutory extensions. See id. at *7. Moreover, observed
the judge, the government's silence and failure timely to apprise the
taxpayer of the newly found Form 872-A constituted egregious conduct that rose to the level of affirmative misconduct. See id. The
judge further observed that the Service conceded that it was inherently unfair to fail to notify Fredericks of the newly located Form
872-A. See id. at *8. The court reasoned that this unfairness prevented the taxpayer from exercising his legal right to negate the
original indefinite extension. See id. at *7. The majority then determined that because only the Service possessed all of the relevant
information regarding the taxpayer's case, it could not later choose
to rely upon a purportedly lost Form 872-A that it secretly found at a
later date. See id. at *8. Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that
the taxpayer carried his burden of demonstrating the applicable misrepresentation and affirmative-misconduct elements. See id. at *10.
Next, the court examined the reliance component of an estoppel claim. See id. Judge Aldisert noted that in order to demonstrate
reliance, a party must prove that he reasonably relied on the misstatement. See id. The judge explained that a plaintiff can prove the
reasonableness requirement by demonstrating that he did not know
of the defendant's misleading conduct, nor should he have known.
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See id. The court commented that Fredericks did not simply rely on
the oral statements of the IRS; rather, the Service repeatedly reinforced its stance by requesting and obtaining three Form 872 yearly
extensions. See id. The majority agreed with the taxpayer's argument that because he reasonably relied on the auditor's statement
that Form 872-A did not exist, he therefore had no need to terminate the indefinite extension. See id. at *11.
Despite concluding that the taxpayer's reliance was reasonable,
the majority buttressed this conclusion by examining the following
three factors: (1) whether the auditor possessed the authority to
partake in the conduct at issue, (2) whether a factual misrepresentation occurred, and (3) if the misstatements profited the Service. See
id. First, the court noted that the government conceded that the
auditor possessed the requisite authority to inform the taxpayer that
it did not possess Form 872-A. See id. at *12. Of more significance,
stressed the court, was the government's concession that the auditor
possessed an obligation to notify Fredericks upon discovering the
lost Form 872-A. See id. Second,Judge Aldisert agreed that a factual,
as opposed to a legal, misrepresentation had occurred. See id. Finally, the judge explained that courts more freely grant estoppel
when the government derives a benefit from its actions. See id. The
Third Circuit found the Service's attempt to seek the tax deficiency
against Fredericks unconscionable because it was the government's
improper actions that induced the taxpayer's inaction in terminating
the indefinite extension of the statute of limitations. See id. at *13.
Next, Judge Aldisert examined whether a detriment resulted
from the actions of the IRS. See id. First, the majority noted that the
taxpayer incurred substantial interest penalties during the eight-year
time period after he believed the last Form 872 extension expired
and during which the Service waited formally to assess the tax deficiency. See id. The court found this expense to be significant by
comparing the higher interest-rate penalties to those of the prevalent market interest rates. See id. at *14. The Third Circuit pointed
out that the economic disadvantage incurred by Fredericks constituted more than a minor technicality because the higher interestrate penalties greatly exceeded the tax deficiency. See id. Judge Aldisert therefore decided that by being wrongfully denied both the
benefit of the original three-year statute of limitations and the opportunity to terminate the Form 872-A, the taxpayer suffered a severe
economic detriment. See id. at *15.
Judge Aldisert concluded the analysis of the taxpayer's estoppel
claim by examining the impact, if any, that such a claim may have on
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government revenues. See id. at *16. The judge remarked that
courts are more willing to allow estoppel claims against the government when the financial effect is relatively minor. See id. In examining this financial consideration, the majority reasoned that Congress's decision to create the three-year statute of limitations, during
which time the IRS could assess tax deficiencies, supported the conclusion that the legislature realized that in certain situations the
Service would lose revenues otherwise rightfully due. See id. at *17.
Further, the court explained that because the facts of the present
case consisted of three separately executed contracts clearly establishing the dates on which the extension of the statute of limitations
would expire, fraudulent lawsuits based merely on the government's
oral misstatements would not abound. See id. Judge Aldisert then
determined the financial impact on the government to be minormerely a tax of approximately $28,361 and interest accrued until the
middle of 1984. See id. at *18. Accordingly, the court reversed the
decision of the tax court and concluded that the taxpayer demonstrated all of the requirements of an estoppel claim. See id. at *18,
*20.
The Third Circuit further remarked that the Service not only
misrepresented not actually possessing Form 872-A, but by remaining silent upon later discovering that it did possess the form, it deprived the taxpayer of his right to terminate the statutory period. See
id. at *18. Moreover, the court maintained that this decision embodied "fundamental notions of fair play." Id. at *19. Lastly, Judge Aldisert observed that in situations similar to the present case, when a
defendant prevents something from being done, that party cannot
take advantage of the plaintiffs nonperformance when caused by the
defendant's own action. See id. (citing RH. Stearns Co. v. United
States, 291 U.S. 54, 61 (1934)).
Authoring a separate opinion, Judge Stapleton agreed that the
taxpayer had established the elements of an estoppel claim against
the Service, but expressed disagreement with the majority's holding
that the government must be left empty-handed as a result. See id. at
*20-21 (Stapleton,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
judge explained that the only reliance by Fredericks was merely his
inaction in terminating the indefinite extension of the statute of
limitations. See id. at *21 (Stapleton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge found it significant that the taxpayer insisted that had he known of the existence of Form 872-A, he would
have promptly revoked the extension in 1984. See id. Judge Stapleton stated that had Fredericks revoked the extension, the Service
would have nonetheless had an additional ninety-day window of time

1997]

THIRD CIRCUIT SURVEY

within which to assess a deficiency. See id. The judge then explained
that because estoppel claims should be tailored to fit the unique factual situations of each case, the Service should recover the original
tax, the statutory interest accrued until the expiration of the last
Form 872, and the market-rate interest accrued until payment is remitted. See id.
The opinion of the Third Circuit reflects the current image of
the "Big, Bad IRS." Here, Fredericks was able to persuade two circuit
judges that because of enormous bureaucracy, a Newark IRS auditor
failed to realize that the Manhattan branch did in fact possess the
taxpayer's Form 872-A. Rather than communicating with the Manhattan branch prior to contacting the taxpayer, however, the auditor
informed Fredericks of the missing Form 872-A and of the need for
three separately executed Form 872s. Believing that there was no
need to terminate a nonexistent Form 872-A, the taxpayer was lulled
into the belief that, regardless of whether he lawfully owed the tax
deficiency, the government would be forever barred from collecting
it upon the expiration of the final Form 872. Although current public attitude conveys a certain level of animosity towards the "Big, Bad
IRS," conniving, wealthy, and sophisticated taxpayers actually do exist, and do attempt to pay little, if any, taxes. Here, the taxpayer may
have originally agreed to a statutory extension because he was concerned that the Service would not agree with his tax-shelter position
and assess additional taxes and penalties. Perhaps Fredericks felt an
extension would enable him better to negotiate a settlement that
would result in the least tax change possible. On the other hand,
had the taxpayer flatly rejected a statutory extension, the Service
would have likely made an assessment based on the facts as they existed at the time and may have overassessed the tax deficiency.
Although Fredericks is a taxpayer victory, future tax attorneys
would be wise to advise their clients that important tax documents
must be sent certified mail. The reality of many situations is that an
"original" document always exists and will eventually resurface, as reflected by the present case. In the end, any conservative tax attorney
should advise his clients simply to execute a Form 872-T when any
doubt exists. Further, in this situation it is also advisable to post a
bond in order to stop the running of interest.
Gregory A. Ichel, C.P.A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE--CLAIM OF
SEXUALLY INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT BY CLERGYMAN DURING THE
COURSE OF PASTORAL COUNSELING, IN BREACH OF THE CLERGYMAN'S
FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED PARISHIONER, COULD BE RESOLVED BY THE
COURTS WITHOUT BECOMING ENTANGLED IN THE CLERGYMAN'S FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION-F.G. v. MacDone/, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d

697 (1997).
Plaintiff F.G., a former parishioner at All Saints Episcopal
Church (All Saints) in Bergenfield, New Jersey, consulted the thenrector of the church, Reverend Alex MacDonell, for counseling from
April 1992 until 1993. See F.G. v. MacDonell 150 NJ. 550, 555, 556,
696 A.2d 697, 700 (1997). Although fully aware of F.G.'s vulnerability, MacDonell, who was married at that time, allegedly induced F.G.
to become involved in a sexual relationship with him. On March 31,
1994, F.G. met with the Reverend Fletcher Harper, successor of
MacDonell as rector of All Saints, in order to discuss MacDonell's
improper conduct and the possibility of making it public to the parishes of both All Saints and an affiliated church, St. Luke's Episcopal
Church (St. Luke's) in Haworth, NewJersey. See id. at 557, 696 A.2d
at 700-01. Although cognizant that F.G. was being treated at a psychiatric hospital and that she had attempted suicide five days prior to
their meeting, Harper nonetheless made the improper relationship
known via a published letter to both parishes and a sermon delivered
to St. Luke's. See id., 696 A.2d at 701. Without obtaining F.G.'s consent, Harper disclosed her identity and described certain details of
their sexual relationship.
F.G. subsequently brought a complaint against both MacDonell
and Harper. See id. at 556-58, 696 A.2d at 700-01. Count I of F.G.'s
complaint sought recovery against MacDonell for clergy malpractice.
See id. at 556, 696 A.2d at 700. Alleging that MacDonell owed her
nothing less than "a special duty of care" to refrain from engaging in
harmful and unethical behavior, the plaintiff asserted that their sexual involvement violated that duty of care owed as a result of their
special relationship. See id. at 556, 557, 696 A.2d at 700. F.G. further
asserted that MacDonell failed to exercise the degree of care, skill,
and diligence exercised by the average pastoral counselor. See id. at
557, 696 A.2d at 700. Count II sought recovery against MacDonell
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for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. In Count III,
F.G. alleged that MacDonell owed her a fiduciary duty to act towards
her in good faith and to refrain from harmful conduct. See id. In
breaching this fiduciary duty by inducing her to engage in a sexual
relationship with him, the plaintiff asserted that MacDonell unlawfully exploited her confidence and trust and created an unreasonable risk of emotional and mental harm. See id.
In Count IV, asserted against Harper, F.G. alleged that Harper
breached the duty of care owed her by publishing her identity and
disclosing the extent and nature of her sexual relationship with
MacDonell. See id., 696 A.2d. at 701. F.G. further asserted in Count
IV that Harper's conduct breached her privacy. See id. In Count V,
the plaintiff alleged that Harper negligently misrepresented that
public disclosure of her identity was beneficial and constituted part
of Harper's pastoral care. See id. In addition, F.G. asserted that
Harper misrepresented her relationship with MacDonell as a romantic, voluntary relationship between mature, consenting adults rather
than as an abusive relationship, and erroneously implied that F.G.
had tried to seduce MacDonell. See id. at 558, 696 A.2d at 701. Finally, in Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX, the plaintiff asserted claims for
defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false depiction, and breach of a fiduciary duty. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed four of
the plaintiffs counts, which alleged negligent infliction of emotional
distress, negligent pastoral counseling, and breach of a fiduciary duty
owed plaintiff by both MacDonell and Harper. See id. In essence,
the trial court dismissed all of F.G.'s claims against MacDonell, while
maintaining all but one of the claims asserted against Harper. See id.
at 555, 696 A.2d at 700.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
trial court's dismissal of F.G.'s claims. See id. at 558, 696 A.2d at 701.
In addition, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court
in order to allow the plaintiff to prove her claims asserted against
both MacDonell and Harper for breach of a fiduciary duty and clergy
malpractice. See id. The New Jersey Supreme Court consequently
granted defendants' leave to appeal. See id. at 555, 696 A.2d at 700.
Affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the appellate division, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that F.G. could
proceed with her claim against MacDonell for breach of a fiduciary
duty. See id. The supreme court explained that an action for breach
of a fiduciary duty, rather than an action for clergy malpractice, affords the plaintiff a more apropos form of relief because it permits
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her to recover monetary damages and allows the judiciary to avoid
potential entanglement with the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See id. at 558, 696 A.2d at 701. The court further
declared that F.G. could proceed with her cause of action against
Harper for breach of a fiduciary duty if the trial court can adjudicate
such a claim without becoming entangled in either church doctrine
or the First Amendment. See id. at 556, 696 A.2d at 700.
Writing for the majority, Justice Pollock commenced the analysis by setting forth the threshold issue: Does the First Amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion protects a clergy member from
the claim of a parishioner for inappropriate sexual conduct during
the course of pastoral counseling? See id. at 558, 696 A.2d at 701.
The justice disagreed with defendants' argument that regardless of
how F.G.'s claims were characterized, such claims inevitably entangled the judiciary in the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 558-59, 696
A.2d at 701. The court then proclaimed that the free exercise of religion prohibits clergy members from engaging in inappropriate
sexual behavior with parishioners seeking pastoral counseling. See id.
at 559, 696 A.2d at 701.
Justice Pollock next delved into an explanation of First
Amendment religious prohibitions. See id. Explaining that the First
Amendment does not outrightly prohibit the judiciary from becoming involved in religious disputes, the justice recognized that the
amendment merely prohibits the judiciary from deciding underlying
questions of religious practice or doctrine. See id. So long as neither
religious practice nor doctrine is implicated, the court continued,
the judiciary is free to apply neutral legal principles to adjudicate religious disputes. See id., 696 A2d at 702. In addition, the majority
stated that parties challenging state action on the theory that such
action violates the free exercise of religion bear the burden of establishing that the action coercively affects religion. See id., 696 A2d at
701. The court next observed that other jurisdictions have held
clergy members liable for the effects of their conduct on others
when such conduct is purely secular. See id. at 560, 696 A.2d at 702.
Similarly, Justice Pollock noted, other jurisdictions have recognized
claims against clergy members for intentional torts. See id.
The supreme court then addressed the plaintiff's argument that
the First Amendment did not protect MacDonell because his actions
fell outside the scope of Episcopal doctrine. See id. Justice Pollock
referred to the depositions of both defendants in which they acknowledged the impropriety of a sexual relationship between a rector and a parishioner as violative of the rector's fiduciary duty owed
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the parishioner. See id. In fact, the justice recounted, both defendants stated that they were not aware of any Episcopal teachings or
doctrine sanctioning such a relationship and that Episcopal teachings actually condemn such behavior. See id. at 560-61, 696 A.2d at
702. Citing additional support for the court's opinion, the majority
announced that the record sufficiently supported the inference that
"MacDonell's alleged misconduct was not an expression of a sincerely held religious belief, but was an egregious violation of the
trust and confidence that F.G. reposed in him." Id. at 561, 696 A.2d
at 702. The court therefore declared that without becoming entangled in the First Amendment the judiciary is the proper forum to decide a claim against a clergy member for sexually improper conduct
during pastoral counseling. See id., 696 A.2d at 702-03.
Justice Pollock next turned to the issue regarding the nature of
the fiduciary duty owed the plaintiff by both MacDonell and Harper.
See id., 696 A.2d at 703. Disagreeing with the appellate division's
creation of a clergy malpractice cause of action, the justice outlined
the inherent problems arising from this type of claim. See id. at 562,
696 A.2d at 703. First, the court explained that because maintaining
a cause of action for clergy malpractice required defining the applicable standard of care, the judiciary would improperly be forced to
establish the skill, training, and standards required of clergy members in all different religions. See id. Second, the majority enunciated that in defining such a standard, the judiciary would also be
forced to identify the practices and beliefs of different religions and
then determine whether the clergy member acted appropriately and
in accordance with them. See id. Lastly, Justice Pollock proclaimed
that such an entanglement by the judiciary in religious doctrine and
practice impermissibly interferes with the free exercise of religion.
See id. at 563, 696 A.2d at 703.
Unlike a cause of action for clergy malpractice, the justice announced, the judiciary can adjudicate a cause of action for a clergy
member's breach of a fiduciary duty without hindering that member's free exercise of religion. See id. Justice Pollock explained that
the nature of a fiduciary relationship entails one party placing his or
her confidence and trust in another party who is in a superior or
dominant position. See id., 696 A.2d at 703-04. The court observed
that in a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary must not only be loyal
to the dependent party, but must also exercise a reasonable degree
of skill and care. See id. at 564, 696 A.2d at 704. In the context of
pastoral counseling, the majority noted, trust and confidence are essential elements of the relationship between pastor and parishioner.
See id. The court maintained that in accepting the role of counselor,
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the pastor accepts the obligations and responsibilities of a fiduciary.
See id. In turn, Justice Pollock recognized, the pastor should be
aware of his dominant position over the vulnerable and trusting parishioner. See id. The justice further remarked that, unlike a claim
for clergy malpractice where a plaintiff must establish both the requisite standard of care and breach of that standard, a claim for
breach of a fiduciary duty merely requires the plaintiff to establish
that she trusted the pastor and the pastor violated that trust. See id.
at 565, 696 A.2d at 704.
Responding to the dissent's refusal to equate pastoral counselors with psychotherapists for purposes of a fiduciary relationship, the
majority
explained
that
"[i]n
the
sanctuary
of
the
church.., troubled parishioners should be able to seek pastoral
counseling free from the fear that the counselors will sexually abuse
them." Id., 696 A.2d at 705. In addition, the court reasoned, F.G.'s
claim did not abridge the pastor's free exercise of religion because
the pastor's conduct was not related to religious doctrine. See id. at
566, 696 A.2d at 705. Justice Pollock further noted that F.G.'s claim
for emotional distress may be maintained because it is consistent
with the general recognition that a plaintiff who suffers emotional
trauma at the hands of a tortfeasor may recover from that tortfeasor.
See id.
Finally, the majority addressed F.G.'s claim against Harper for
breach of a fiduciary duty. See id. The court opined that evaluating
church sermons and letters to congregations might potentially and
unconstitutionally entangle the judiciary in religious doctrine. See id.
Consequently, Justice Pollock proclaimed, the trial court can only adjudicate F.G.'s claim against Harper if the court refers to neutral legal principles and thereby avoids any entanglement with religious
doctrine or practice. See id. at 567, 696 A.2d at 705. The justice
therefore ordered the trial court to hold a pretrial hearing in order
to determine the possibility of neutrally adjudicating F.G.'s claim
against Harper for breach of a fiduciary duty. See id.
Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Hern proclaimed that the majority misinterpreted the constitutional issue entirely by concluding
that the pastor's conduct was tortious. See id., 696 A.2d at 706
(O'HernJ., dissenting). The dissent explained that it is impossible
for the judiciary to define the obligations and duties of a clergy
member, in order to impose civil liability accordingly, without unconstitutionally establishing an official religion. See id. at 568, 696
A.2d at 706 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern announced that
while it is well established that clergy members may be held liable for
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any torts they commit, there is no law that makes it a crime or tort
for consenting adults to become involved in sexual relationships. See
id. The justice further observed that the only basis for liability set
forth in the plaintiff's complaint was that during the course of pastoral counseling, MacDonell breached the duty of care owed her. See
id. In fact, the dissent noted, had MacDonell been F.G.'s friend, coworker, or neighbor seeking to comfort her, no secular law would attach civil or criminal liability to their extramarital affair. See id.
The dissent next clarified the confusion arising from courts mistakenly permitting members of religious bodies to assert the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as a defense to plainly tortious conduct. See id. at 570, 696 k2d at 707 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern explained that such courts rejected claims of
clergy malpractice on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause solely because the courts feared wandering down a "slippery slope" into questions and issues of liability that cannot be constitutionally determined. See id. The justice, however, remarked that the "slippery
slope" fear is baseless because there is no need to create a new tort of
clergy malpractice for conduct that is already recognized as tortious.
See id. Agreeing with the majority, the dissent professed that because
there exists such a wide range of differing religions, it would not only
be unconstitutional, but also impractical, to compel all pastoral
counselors to adhere to a standard duty of care. See id. at 571, 696
A.2d at 707 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
Justice O'Hern next acknowledged that a cleric who holds himself out as a member of another profession and provides secular
counseling to a parishioner may be held liable for his misconduct
not on the basis of clergy malpractice, but because he violated the
standards of the other profession. See id. The justice countered that
because MacDonell did not assume any secular duties and F.G.'s
complaint explicitly alleged that MacDonell failed to abide by the
standards of pastoral care providers, the plaintiff disguised the unrecognized tort of clergy malpractice as a tort for breach of a fiduciary duty. See id., 696 A.2d at 708 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). In fact, the
dissent observed, alleging a breach of a fiduciary relationship is
"'simply an elliptical way to state a clergy malpractice claim.'" Id. at
571-72, 696 A.2d at 708 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting Dausch v.
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition, Justice
O'Hern noted, if there exists a general duty applicable to all fiduciaries to abstain from sexual conduct with their clients, then the majority opinion can be extended to cover all investment advisors, real estate agents, and trust officers. See id. at 572, 696 A.2d at 708
(O'Hern,J., dissenting).
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The dissent further declared that the majority transgressed the
principles upon which the United States was founded by imposing a
civil sanction on MacDonell's violation of the doctrine and teachings
of the Episcopal religion. See id. at 573, 696 A.2d at 708-09 (O'Hern,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Hem forewarned that breach of the doctrines of a religion not as universally accepted as Episcopalianism
may in the future give rise to yet another type of tort. See id., 696
A.2d at 709 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Such a result, the justice observed, was neither contemplated nor anticipated by the constitutional framers. See id. The dissent further explained that in the absence of an amendment permitting claims of illegal or criminal
sexual conduct, NewJersey has no official state religion that converts
MacDonell's conduct into a tort. See id. at 573-74, 696 A.2d at 709
(O'Hern,J., dissenting).
Lastly, Justice O'Hern instructed that F.G.'s claims against
Harper for breach of a pastoral fiduciary duty should be dismissed
for the reasons already set forth by the dissent. See id. at 574, 696
A-2d at 709 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). Thejustice then reiterated that
although the First Amendment provides no defense to sexual abuse
or sexual crimes, no general civil law exists that converts consensual
sexual conduct between competent adults into a tort. See id. In making MacDonell's conduct a tort solely because he is a member of a
religious body, the dissent continued, the court has impermissibly
created a tort action based on a breach of the doctrine and teachings
of the Episcopal religion. See id. Creating such a tort action, the dissent proclaimed, creates an establishment of religion and plainly violates the First Amendment. See id.
In allowing F.G. to maintain a claim against her pastor for
breach of a fiduciary duty owed her during the course of pastoral
counseling, the New Jersey Supreme Court has declared to religious
bodies that certain conduct occurring within the confines of a
church, temple, or other place of worship will no longer be shielded
under the First Amendment's umbrella of religious protections. In
so doing, the court has correctly provided vulnerable parishioners
with an appropriate form of relief in an area where the potent fear of
religious entanglement had previously deterred any such relief.
Moreover, the majority's decision has ingeniously struck a balance
between risking excessive entanglement in religious doctrine, as
would be the case in allowing claims of clergy malpractice, and providing parishioners an avenue of redress for wrongs committed
against them by trusted religious bodies.
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F. G. v. MacDonell failed to predict, however, what would be the
outcome in a case where the clergy member's inappropriate conduct
during pastoral counseling falls within the scope of his religious doctrine or practice. This case was less problematic because both defendants admitted that engaging in a sexual relationship with a parishioner during pastoral counseling was condemned by the
Episcopal religion. The problem will therefore arise when a clergy
member of a less-recognized or alternative religion claims that his religion sanctions, and even recommends, engaging in sexual relationships with parishioners during counseling. In such a situation, it
would appear that a claim of a breach of a fiduciary duty could not
be adjudicated by the courts because it would require the judiciary to
determine underlying questions about the validity of that particular
religion's doctrine and practices. The majority opinion should
therefore be applied only to situations where it is unambiguously
certain that the inappropriate conduct was not in any manner associated with the teachings of a religion and not part of the clergy
member's sincerely held religious beliefs.
Yanet Perez

CONTRACTS-IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING-A PARTY'S CONDUCT IN PERFORMING AND TERMINATING A

CONTRACT MAY BREACH THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING EVEN IF THE TERMINATION IS PURSUANT TO AN EXPRESS
AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERM IN THE CONTRACT-Sons of Thunder,Inc. v.
Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 690 A.2d 575 (1997).
Defendant-respondent Borden, Inc., owns and operates Snow
Food Products Division, a major producer of clam products. See Sons
of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 NJ. 396, 399, 690 A.2d 575, 576
(1997). Borden operates a four-vessel fleet in order to supply and
harvest the required stock of clams.
In 1978, the defendantrespondent hired the plaintiff-petitioner, Donald DeMusz, as captain
of one of the company's four boats. During DeMusz's tenure as captain, he and Borden entered into an agreement whereby DeMusz
would operate and manage Borden's entire fleet. To do so, DeMusz
formed Sea Labor, Inc. See id. at 399-400, 690 A.2d at 576.
During the time DeMusz acted as captain and manager of Borden's fleet, he assisted Borden in developing a project called "Shuckat-Sea." See id. at 400, 690 A.2d at 576-77. The project consisted of
developing equipment that would enable fishermen to shuck clams
while at sea rather than back on land. See id., 690 A.2d at 576. To
implement the program successfully, Borden needed a boat large
enough to carry the shucking equipment. See id., 690 A.2d at 577.
Rather than purchase its own boat, Borden entered into an agreement with DeMusz whereby he would purchase his own large boat.
Once again, DeMusz formed a corporation, Sea Work, Inc., to purchase and operate a clam-fishing vessel named Jessica Lori
Despite initial problems with the installation of the shucking
equipment on the Jessica Lori, Borden decided to obtain a second
boat to operate the "Shuck-at-Sea" project. See id. at 401, 690 A.2d at
577. As with the purchase of the first vessel, Borden negotiated an
agreement with DeMusz for DeMusz to purchase the second boat.
DeMusz eventually did so through another newly formed corporation, Sons of Thunder, Inc. See id. at 402, 690 A.2d at 577.
Under the parties' agreement, Sons of Thunder was to offer for
sale all harvested shell stock to Borden. See id., 690 A.2d at 578. The
agreement further provided that Borden would purchase a mini-
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year. At the end of the initial one year period, the contract would be
renewed automatically for a maximum of five years. Either party,
however, could cancel the contract by providing written notice of
termination ninety days before the effective cancellation date.
Initially, Sons of Thunder encountered difficulties in obtaining
a loan to finance the purchase of its second boat. An operations
manager for Borden, however, assured the lending bank that DeMusz and Borden had a solid relationship and that Borden expected
the parties' agreement to last for five years. As a result, DeMusz was
able to secure a loan that allowed his company to purchase a boat it
subsequently named Sons of Thunder. See id. at 403, 690 A.2d at 578.
While Borden and Sons of Thunder negotiated their latest
agreement, the Jessica Lori encountered operating difficulties. The
shucking equipment installed on the vessel was not functioning
properly and therefore had to be removed and redesigned. Consequently, the Jessica Lori proved incapable of harvesting clams and
generating any income. In addition, the boat had to be rerigged at a
cost of $350,000. See id. at 404, 690 A.2d at 578-79.
To acquire the necessary funds for rerigging the Jessica Lor4
DeMusz once again sought financing from the bank. See id., 690
A.2d at 579. At this time, the management at Borden underwent
several changes. The new management nonetheless supported DeMusz's proposal for a loan that would be made to DeMusz's management company, Sea Labor. In computing Sea Labor's income for
the loan proposal, the bank considered several factors including
Sons of Thunder's contract with Borden, Sea Labor's management
fees, and the income derived from the Jessica Lori. See id. at 404-05,
690 A.2d at 579. The bank ultimately approved the loan for
$150,000, leaving Sea Work short $200,000 of the rerigging cost. See
id. at 405, 690 A.2d at 579.
During the time of the financing negotiations, Borden's new
management became aware for the first time that Borden and Sons
of Thunder were contractually bound. Upon learning of the contract, the new management told DeMusz that Borden had no intentions of honoring the contract and purchasing the specified minimum amount of shell stock. Despite Borden's expressed intentions
of not honoring the contract, DeMusz continued to pursue financing for the rerigging of theJessicaLori.
The additional funds needed for the rerigging were ultimately
acquired through Sons of Thunder. Sons of Thunder financed a
loan from the bank and, in turn, transferred the money to Sea Work.
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To do so, however, Sons of Thunder was obligated to guarantee
every loan undertaken by Sea Work for the Jessica Lo. Additionally,
the bank required unity of ownership between the various corporations. Consequently, DeMusz and the other partners of Sons of
Thunder acquired ownership of Sea Work. In November 1996, after
the financing and the rerigging were completed, the Jessica Lori became adequately equipped with the "Shuck-at-Sea" technology and
the project was successfully implemented.
The initial success of the "Shuck-at-Sea" project began to diminish during the end of 1986 when Borden purchased Doxsee, a seafood company. A new plant manager was brought in from Doxsee,
and he immediately announced that he would also not honor the
Sons of Thunder contract. See id. at 405, 406, 690 A.2d at 579.
Thereafter, Borden not only decreased its required purchases from
the Sons of Thunder, but also lowered the price it paid for the clams
purchased. See id. at 406, 690 A.2d at 579. Additionally, Borden began sending the Sons of Thunder out to harvest clams only in inclement weather. See id., 690 A.2d at 580. Borden likewise ceased purchasing the specified amount of clam meat from the Jessica Lori and
consistently paid less than the sixty cents per pound price stated in
the agreement.
Borden later obtained two more boats from Doxsee for the harvesting of clams. The addition of these two boats eliminated Borden's need for independent harvesters. This factor, along with an
internal memo recommending that the "Shuck-at-Sea" program be
terminated because it was not profitable, caused Borden to notify
Sons of Thunder and Sea Work on May 8, 1987, that it was terminating their respective contracts. See id. at 407, 690 A.2d at 580. Borden
terminated both contracts in accordance with the specified time
limitations set forth in the agreements.
Within ten days of sending the notices of termination, Borden
removed the harvesting equipment from the Sons of Thunder. During
the following weeks, the boat was permanently docked. Eventually,
the remaining partners were forced to sell the boat at cost because
no market existed for the Sons of Thunder. See id. at 408, 690 A2d at
581.
Sons of Thunder filed a complaint against Borden on April 4,
1990, alleging breach of contract. See id. Sons of Thunder requested
damages for Borden's failure to purchase the agreed amount of shell
stock, both before and after terminating the contracts, and for the
Sons of Thunders diminution in value flowing from the breach. See id.
In response, Borden filed a motion requesting partial summary
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judgment as to the alleged breach after the date the contract was
terminated, on the theory that termination was expressly permitted
by the contract. See id. at 409, 690 A.2d at 581.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, denied Borden's
motion for partial summary judgment, finding that a genuine issue
of material fact existed regarding the intent of the parties in formulating the termination provision and that it was unclear whether the
contract fully integrated the parties' agreement. See id. at 410, 690
A.2d at 581-82. The trial court also found that the defendantrespondent's affidavits raised a question of fair dealing. See id., 690
A.2d at 581. Sons of Thunder then amended its initial complaint
and added a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See id. Sons of Thunder also amended the damages
sought to include lost profits for the entire five-year contract. See id.
at 411, 690 A.2d at 582.
The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict for
Sons of Thunder for the breach of contract claim prior to the termination by Borden and for the breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 411, 412, 690 A.2d at 582. The
jury, however, found that Borden's termination of the contract was
consistent with the agreement of the parties. See id. at 412, 690 A.2d
at 582. The jury awarded Sons of Thunder $412,000 in damages for
lost sales to Borden caused by breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 412, 413, 690 A.2d at 583.
Following the verdict, Borden filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contending that a party cannot be found
liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when terminating a contract if the contract contains an explicit
termination clause. See id. at 413, 690 A.2d at 583. The trial court
denied the defendant-respondent's motion and reasoned that
whether Borden breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing must be analyzed by focusing on Borden's entire conduct under the agreement and not solely on its termination. See id.
The trial court therefore concluded that the manner in which Borden performed its obligations under the agreement created an issue
for the jury. See id.
In a divided opinion, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, held that the trial court erroneously denied granting Borden's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 414,
690 A2d at 584. The majority declared that "'the right of Borden to
terminate the contract on ninety-days notice in accordance with its
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express terms cannot be overridden or eliminated by an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" Id. (citation omitted). Alternatively, the appellate court explained that Borden's actions did
not amount to bad faith. See id. Sons of Thunder subsequently appealed the decision of the appellate division. See id. at 415, 690 A.2d
at 584.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
ruling. See id. at 398, 690 A-2d at 576. The court held that every contract in New Jersey, including one that contains an explicit and unambiguous termination clause, contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. See id. at 398, 420, 421, 690 A.2d at 576,
587. As a result, the supreme court concluded, a jury could reasonably determine that a party performed and terminated a contract in
bad faith even if it finds that the termination itself did not breach
any express provision of the contract. See id. at 424, 690 A.2d at 589.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a unanimous court, initially agreed
with the appellate court's ruling that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot be used to override a contract's explicit
termination clause. See id. at 419, 690 A.2d at 586. The justice, however, emphasized that whether an express termination clause has
been violated is separate and distinct from whether a party's performance during the contractual period constituted bad faith. See id.
at 419, 420, 690 A.2d at 586-87. The court then opined that when
the jury is properly instructed as to this distinction, it can reasonably
infer that a party has breached the latter without breaching the former. See id.
The court then proceeded to determine whether the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the distinction between violating a contract's express provision and performing a contract in
bad faith. See id. at 418, 419, 690 A.2d at 586-87. Justice Garibaldi
explained that in reviewing a trial court's jury instructions, an appellate court must analyze the jury charge as a whole. See id. at 418, 690
A.2d 586. The justice emphasized that an appellate court must not
reverse the trial court if the jury charge properly conveyed the law
and was neither confusing nor misleading to the jury. See id. The
court then concluded that the jury instructions in the present case
adequately conveyed the law and neither confused nor misled the
jury. See id. at 419-20, 690 K.2d at 586-87. The court explained that
the jury was explicitly instructed to consider the issue of Borden's
termination, as it related to the express terms of the agreement, as
separate and distinct from the issue of whether Borden's conduct in
performance of the contract constituted bad faith. See id. Justice
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Garibaldi further noted that the trial court explicitly informed the
jury that, unlike a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, a party's motive for terminating an agreement
is irrelevant when considering whether the party violated the contract's express terms. See id. at 419, 690 A.2d at 586.
Next, the court recognized that it is well established that the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is included in every
contract in NewJersey. See id. at 420, 690 A.2d at 587. Justice Garibaldi declared that this rule of law extends even to contracts that contain an express provision allowing either party to terminate the
agreement without cause. See id. at 421, 690 A.2d at 587. The justice
reasoned that a party exercising an unconditional and explicit right
to terminate may have nonetheless performed its contractual obligations in bad faith and in breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. See id. at 422, 690 A.2d at 588.
Justice Garibaldi next focused on whether it was reasonable for
the jury to conclude that Borden failed to perform its obligations
under the agreement in good faith. See id. at 424, 690 A.2d at 589.
In conducting this inquiry, the justice considered Borden's conduct
during the performance of the contract and during the time period
surrounding the termination of the agreement. See id. Specifically,
the court referred to Borden's constant failure to purchase from Sons
of Thunder the weekly specified amount of clams, despite its awareness that Sons of Thunder relied on that income to repay its loans.
See id. The court also identified Borden's refusal to fulfill its obligations to Sea Work, despite knowing that Sons of Thunder was liable
for the debts of Sea Work and that the failure of one company would
most likely result in the failure of the other. See id. at 424-25, 690
A.2d at 589. Lastly, Justice Garibaldi noted that towards the end of
the parties' contractual relationship, Borden sent Sons of Thunder out
only in inclement weather. See id. at 425, 690 A.2d at 589.
After assessing the facts, the court proclaimed that it was reasonable for ajury to conclude that Borden failed to perform its obligations under the agreement in good faith. See id. at 424, 690 A.2d
at 589. Justice Garibaldi declared that Borden's conduct prevented
Sons of Thunder from receiving the fruits of the agreement, and in
so doing, constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing derived from New Jersey's common law. See id. at
425, 690 A.2d at 589.
Lastly, the supreme court affirmed the jury's award for lost profits caused by Borden's breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See id. Acknowledging that an award for lost profits
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is appropriate whenever a buyer to a contract breaches the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court determined that
the jury's award in the amount of $412,000 was both a fair and reasonable estimate of expectation damages. See id.
In allowing the jury verdict to stand in favor of Sons of Thunder,
the New Jersey Supreme Court unequivocally reaffirmed the principle that every party to a contract in NewJersey must perform its contractual obligations in good faith. In so doing, the court once again
gave life to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the implied covenant was previously recognized in New Jersey as a viable legal doctrine, the failure of even the plaintiffpetitioner in this case to plead it in the original complaint evinces
that its practical application has been minimal. The covenant's importance in contractual relationships, however, cannot be overstated
when one considers, for example, the grievous conduct of the defendant-respondent in the present case. Without imposing an obligation of good faith on the contracting parties, an individual in the
position of the Sons of Thunder plaintiff-petitioner would be left without a remedy when a defendant atrociously performs the express
terms of an agreement. As such, the Sons of Thunder decision is significant not so much for what it establishes, but rather for what it affirms.

Ricardo SolanoJr.

CRIMINAL LAW-WEAPON POSSESSION-A DEFENDANT'S ORIGINAL

LAWFUL PURPOSE FOR POSSESSING A BEER STEIN DOES NOT
PRECLUDE A CONVICTION FOR THIRD-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A

WEAPON FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE WHERE THE DEFENDANT USES
THE OBJECT TO ASSAULT A BAR PATRON--State v. Villar, 150 N.J. 503,

696 A.2d 674 (1997).
On New Year's Eve, 1992, defendantJuan Carlos Villar was a patron at a TGI Friday's bar and restaurant in Iselin, New Jersey. See
State v. Villar, 150 N.J. 503, 507, 696 A.2d 674, 675 (1997). Villar had
been drinking vodka prior to arriving at the bar and was admittedly
intoxicated. See id., 696 A.2d at 675-76. During the course of the
evening, Villar became perturbed at a bartender who removed his
ashtray and kept him waiting for a check. See id., 696 A.2d at 676.
Becoming increasingly irritated with the bartender, Villar threw his
lit cigarette over the side of the bar. Another patron, Nancy Collar,
slid an ashtray in the direction of Villar and allegedly stated, "Here,
try this, you jerk." In response, Villar punched Gollar in the face
with the beer stein he was holding in his hand. See id. at 508, 696
A.2d at 676. Villar stated that he only intended to douse Collar with
his drink and that he may have accidentally hit her with the stein. See
id. at 507-08, 696 A.2d at 676. Following the exchange, Villar fled
from the establishment, only to be detained by several patrons outside. See id. at 508, 696 A-2d at 676.
Gollar was covered in blood, and the impact of the blow left her
with a broken tooth and a severe laceration to her lip. Gollar underwent surgery and dental repair as a result of the assault. Collar
claimed that long after the incident she continued to experience
pain in her mouth and gums.
Following a trial by jury in the NewJersey Superior Court, Law
Division, Villar was found guilty of the second-degree aggravated assault charge. See id. For utilizing the beer stein in the assault, the
jury also convicted Villar of third-degree possession of a weapon for
an unlawful purpose. See id. Finally, Villar was found guilty of simple
assault, which was charged as a lesser-included offense under the
charge of third-degree aggravated assault. See id. at 508-09, 696 A.2d
at 676. The trial court merged the two assault convictions and sentenced Villar to five years imprisonment. See id. at 509, 696 A.2d at
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676. Villar also received a concurrent term of three years imprisonment for the weapon possession charge. See id
Reversing the trial court, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, vacated the second-degree aggravated assault and
weapon possession convictions. See id The appellate court remanded to the trial court the simple assault conviction for resentencing. See id
Reversing the judgment of the appellate division, an unanimous
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the defendant could be convicted of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose despite that the weapon was originally used in a lawful manner.
See id. at 514, 696 A.2d at 679. The court reasoned that a conviction
for an unlawful weapon possession was not precluded by the defendant's original lawful purpose in possessing the object. See id
Writing for the court, Justice O'Hern first considered the two
underlying principles behind criminal responsibility in relation to
the case before the court. See id at 509, 696 A.2d at 676. The first
principle, according to the justice, is the gradation of criminal assault for purposes of sentencing and charging offenders. See id, 696
A.2d at 676-77. The court explained that the level of seriousness of
criminal assault varies according to factors such as the use of weapons, the gravity of the injury inflicted, the victim's status, and the
perpetrator's state of mind. See id, 696 A.2d at 677.
The second principle offered by Justice O'Hern involved the
regulation of weapons and their classification as lawful or unlawful.
See id at 510, 696 A.2d at 677. As an example, the justice noted that
possession of an object such as a box-cutter may be unlawful under
"'circumstances not manifestly appropriate for [ ] lawful uses.'" Id
(citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5d; State v. Kelly, 118 NJ. 370, 571
A.2d 1286 (1990); State v. Lee 96 NJ. 156, 475 A.2d 31 (1984)). In
contrast, the court emphasized that possession of objects such as a
sawed-off shotguns is per se unlawful. See id The supreme court further explained that possession of other objects such as baseball bats
may be unlawful depending on the manner in which the objects are
used. See id
Next, the justice explained that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt four elements in order to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:39-4d. See id Under the statute, Justice O'Hern remarked, the State must prove that the item was a weapon, that the
defendant possessed knowledge of control over the specific weapon,
that the defendant's purpose was to utilize the weapon against an-
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other person or his property, and that the defendant intended to
utilize the weapon in an unlawful manner. See id, The court stressed
that the rationale behind the statute was to deter and prohibit the
criminal intent to use weapons, not simply possession per se. See id,
Due to the complexities in understanding the distinction between
lawful and unlawful weapon possession, the supreme court stated
that a jury instruction must include a description of the unlawful
purpose behind the specific charge. See id. at 511, 696 A.2d at 677.
The court then disagreed with the reasoning of the appellate
division in interpreting and applying State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189,
516 A.2d 1047 (1986). See id at 511-12, 696 A.2d at 677-78. In Harmon, Justice O'Hern explained, the defendant possessed a BB gun,
which required a permit, in anticipation of being attacked by another. See id&at 512, 696 A.2d at 678. The State's position in Harmon, according to the justice, was that the defendant "could not argue that his purpose to carry the gun was lawful if the possession
itself was unlawful." Id. The supreme court observed that the defendant in Harmon was allowed to present as a defense to the jury
that while he did possess the BB gun, he did so without intending to
harm anyone. See id, The significance of this defense, as noted by
the court, is that the State must prove that a defendant acted with a
criminal state of mind at "whatever time" during the course of the
defendant's weapon possession. See id
Justice O'Hern considered the facts of the case at bar and determined that the defendant's initial purpose in possessing the beer
stein was lawful. See id. at 513, 696 A.2d at 678. The court warned,
however, that Villar could be criminally liable if his purpose for possessing the stein became unlawful. See id, As an example, Justice
O'Hern commented that a homeowner with benign homeprotection intentions could be prosecuted for unlawful weapon possession for keeping a baseball bat under his bed if the homeowner
instead uses the weapon for the purpose of attacking his spouse. See
id. The justice then explained that the jury could have determined
that Villar's purpose was to commit an unlawful assault when he
picked up the stein and struck Gollar in the face. See id, at 514, 696
A.2d at 679. As such, the supreme court determined that the jury
could have also concluded that Villar's lawful possession of a beer
stein became unlawful at the point in time when he decided to use it
for an unlawful purpose. See id. Justice O'Hern therefore declared
that a reasonable jury could find that the State satisfied the four criteria set forth in Harmon for determining unlawful weapon possession: (1) the beer stein became a weapon capable of causing bodily
injury, (2) Villar established control over the object, (3) Villar's pur-
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pose was to strike Gollar in the face, and (4) the law prohibits using a
beer stein for the purpose of committing an assault on another. See
id.
The court next addressed Villar's claim before the appellate division that a single incident of striking Gollar in the face could not
possibly give rise to two different levels of culpability. See id. at 515,
696 A.2d at 679. Justice O'Hem explained that the jury had determined that Villar acted recklessly in demonstrating an extreme indifference to human life and negligently causing bodily injury to another with the use of a weapon. See i&i Furthermore, the court
detailed Villar's incredulity in the jury's finding that he inflicted serious bodily injury in one count of the indictment and only bodily
injury in a separate count. See id, Next, Justice O'Hern recounted
Villar's assertion that he was entitled to a separate jury instruction as
to the third-degree aggravated assault charge. See id. at 516, 696 A.2d
at 680. Finally, the justice considered the appellate division's finding
that the trial court erred in the issuance of jury instructions and that
Villar should have only been charged with negligent simple assault
with a deadly weapon. See id. at 518, 696 A.2d at 681.
Justice O'Hern summarily dismissed Villar's claim of inconsistency in the jury's verdict. See id, Instead, the justice explained that
the elements of each charge facing Villar varied. See id, at 519, 696
A.2d at 681. In considering explanations for the claimed inconsistency in the verdicts, the court first noted that none of the jury's
findings conflicted with or negated an element of any of the other
charges. See id., 696 A.2d at 681-82. Furthermore, the supreme court
observed that the jury may have given credence to Villar's defense of
intoxication. See id., 696 A.2d at 682. Finally, the court rejected the
appellate division's determination that Villar should have only been
charged with negligent simple assault with a deadly weapon. See id
at 518, 696 A.2d at 681. Instead, Justice O'Hern stated that the evidence showed that Villar committed an aggravated assault. See id,
The justice recalled that Gollar and another witness testified that Villar had smashed the beer stein directly into Gollar's face. See i&
Based on this evidence, the court determined that ajury could have
concluded that Villar acted in a manner that was "knowing or purposeful or reckless under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id Moreover, based upon Gollar's injuries, the court found that ajury might have concluded that
Gollar sustained serious bodily injury, instead of mere bodily injury.
See id.
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The supreme court thus reversed the judgment of the appellate
division and remanded the case. See id. at 519, 696 A.2d at 682. Justice O'Hern ordered that Villar be retried on the count of seconddegree aggravated assault. See id. Finally, the justice clarified the
lesser-included offenses of second-degree assault and reinstated Villar's conviction for third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. See
id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the proper result in
this case. An individual who assaults another, as in this case, should
not be able to escape liability for unlawful possession of a weapon
merely because his original purpose behind using the object was lawful. As the court indicated, the rationale behind the statute criminalizing possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose seeks to prohibit the unlawful use of these weapons, and not mere possession.
See id. at 510, 696 A.2d at 677.
One can easily envision a scenario in which the court's holding
is more easily applied and understood. For example, if an individual
is lawfully using an object such as a chainsaw and then without
provocation proceeds to assault another with that weapon, it is clear
that such an individual should be convicted of possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose. Although the distinction tends to
blur when the court considers assaults with objects such as beer
steins, the punishment still must fit the crime.
Shane H. Freedman

DAMAGES-NEGLIGENT
RECOVERY

FOR

INFLICTION

EMOTIONAL

OF EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS

BASED

ON

DISTRESSA

FEAR

OF

CONTRACTING AIDS IS LIMITED TO A CERTAIN PERIOD AND ANALYZED
UNDER A STANDARD OF ENHANCED REASONABLENESS THAT REQUIRES
KNOWLEDGE OF ACCURATE, THEN-CURRENT, AND GENERALLY
AVAILABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE DISEASE, AND DOES NOT
INCLUDE DAMAGES FOR PROLONGED DISTRESS ATTRIBUTABLE TO A
TREATING PHYSICIAN'S UNFORESEEABLE,
INCORRECT ADVICE-

Williamson v. Waldman, 150 NJ. 232, 696 A.2d 14 (1997).
Plaintiff Karen Williamson worked for her husband's cleaning
business. See Williamson v. Waldman, 150 NJ. 232, 236, 696 A.2d 14,
16 (1997). On June 6, 1991, Williamson was cleaning a regular garbage receptacle in the examining room of the defendant doctors,
Leonard WaldmanJeffrey Feldman, andJacques Losman. While doing so, Williamson was pricked by a lancet, a small surgical knife used
to obtain blood samples. Williamson finished her work, washed her
hands, and left the doctors' office. Before going home, Williamson
stopped at the home of her sister-in-law and discussed the incident
with a nurse who was also visiting. See id. at 236-37, 696 A.2d at 16.
The nurse advised Williamson to go directly to the emergency room.
See id. at 237, 696 A.2d at 16. As a result, Williamson became
alarmed and concerned with the potential for exposure to hepatitis
and HIV from the lancet prick.
Four days later, Williamson visited her treating physician, Dr.
DeMasi, to discuss the possibility of contracting diseases from the
lancet prick. Dr. DeMasi recommended screening for HIV over a period of years. Williamson and Dr. DeMasi disputed at trial whether
an HIV test was administered during her initial visit. Eight months
later, Williamson returned to Dr. DeMasi and complained of fatigue.
At that time, the doctor prescribed her an antidepressant medication.

Despite repeatedly testing negative for HIV for three years following the lancet prick, Williamson claimed that the incident caused
her to become depressed and prevented her from having more children because she feared that they would be born HIV-positive. See id.
at 237-38, 696 A-2d at 16. Williamson also claimed that since the in-

732

NEWJERSEY SURVEY

733

cident, she has only engaged in protected sexual relations with her
husband. See id at 238, 696 A.2d at 16.
Williamson filed an action alleging that the defendants
breached a duty of reasonable care, causing her to suffer severe
physical and mental pain, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of earning capacity. See id, 696 A.2d at 16-17. In addition to Williamson's
claims, her husband claimed to suffer loss of consortium due to the
defendants' actions. See id, 696 A.2d at 17. The defendants moved
for summary judgment at the completion of discovery. See id at 239,
696 A.2d at 17.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Williamson
failed to show an exposure to HIV. See id. The court further concluded that because the test results were negative, Williamson's fears
were "idiosyncratic" and that the defendants' actions did not proximately cause Williamson's emotional distress. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
trial court's decision and held that proof of actual exposure was unnecessary. See id The court reasoned that Williamson could recover
upon showing the reasonableness of her fears. See id. As such, the
appellate division remanded the case to allow a jury to decide the
question of reasonableness. See id
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the appellate division's reversal of summaryjudgment. See id.
The court held that the standard for determining proximate cause in
an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress required a
plaintiff to show that the same "genuine and substantial emotional
distress... would be experienced by a reasonable person of ordinary
experience who has a level of knowledge that coincides with thencurrent, accurate, and generally available public information about
the causes and transmission of AIDS." Id at 249, 696 A.2d at 22.
The court then concluded that Williamson's emotional distress extended beyond that experienced by a reasonable person and denied
recovery because the continued distress was not based on defendants' breach, but on unforeseeable and inaccurate information received from Williamson's doctor. See id at 251-53, 696 A.2d at 23-24.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Handler commenced the
opinion by describing the nature of the case. See idt at 236, 696 A.2d
at 16. The justice noted that Williamson brought suit for negligent
infliction of emotional distress based on her fear of contracting AIDS
from the improperly discarded lancet. See id In order to analyze
Williamson's claim, the court declared that the issue was whether the
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standard for determining causation for emotional distress claims was
based on objective factors such as exposure to HIV, or whether it was
sufficient to prove reasonableness of the emotional distress. See id
Next, Justice Handler reviewed the facts of the case. See id. at
236-37, 696 A.2d at 16. Focusing on the day of the lancet prick, the
justice noted that Williamson first became alarmed after her discussion with the nurse who was visiting Williamson's sister-in-law. See id.
at 237, 696 A.2d at 16. The justice emphasized that Williamson was
informed by her doctor after the second negative test result-two
years after the incident-that her chances of contracting HIV from
the lancet prick were remote or slim. See id. With respect to Williamson's decision to postpone having children, the court noted that the
initial reason for the delay was that Williamson's husband had a rare
blood disorder that interfered with the ability to fight infection. See
id. at 237-38, 696 A.2d at 16. Justice Handler pointed out, however,
that the disorder had been controlled by drugs prior to the incident
and Williamson's hope of having more children had therefore been
renewed. See id at 238, 696 A.2d at 16.
Justice Handler then outlined the traditional elements of duty,
breach, and causation that make up a prima facie case for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 239, 696 A.2d at 17. The
justice highlighted New Jersey jurisprudence that shaped the law of
negligence and explained that in cases of emotional distress, there is
a basic requirement of foreseeability. See id. Furthermore, the supreme court explained, NewJersey courts have required plaintiffs to
prove that their emotional distress is both genuine and substantial.
See id. at 240, 696 A.2d at 18.
Next, the court compared the law of other jurisdictions and
noted that the majority of courts apply an objective standard to determine causation for emotional distress based on a fear of contracting AIDS. See id. Most of these courts, Justice Handler pointed out,
require plaintiffs to show actual exposure to HIV to satisfy the element of causation. See id. at 241, 696 A.2d at 18. The justice further
noted that some of these jurisdictions also require plaintiffs to prove
a medically viable channel of transmission of the HIV virus. See id.
In order to contrast the objective standard, Justice Handler recognized that some jurisdictions do not require proof of actual exposure to determine causation in these types of emotional distress
cases, but instead rely on a reasonableness standard. See id. at 242,
696 A.2d at 19. Thejustice then highlighted two cases that expressly
rejected the requirement of proving actual exposure. See id. at 242-
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43, 696 A.2d at 19 (citing Faya v. Almarz, 329 Md. 435 (1993); Castro
v. New YorkLife Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)).
The court further highlighted several important policy justifications for the requirements of proving actual exposure and a channel
of transmission. See id, at 243, 696 A.2d at 19. The first of these policies, the supreme court explained, is to discourage unreliable or
fraudulent claims. See id, The second justification, according tojustice Handler, is the need to counteract the ignorance surrounding
AIDS transmission as well as irrational fears, stigmatization, and discrimination fostered by such ignorance. See id. at 243-44, 696 A.2d at
19. As such, the justice concluded that a low threshold, such as a
reasonableness standard, could not sufficiently counteract these
problems. See id, at 244, 696 A.2d at 20.
The supreme court also recognized that the objective standard
was criticized for its failure to provide information to counteract ignorance. See id, The court noted that the standard inappropriately
inferred that a fear of contracting AIDS without proof of actual exposure was unreasonable. See id. at 244-45, 696 A.2d at 20.
Turning to the considerations supporting the reasonableness
standard, Justice Handler noted that this standard prevented unfair
results such as those that occur when the strict objective test is applied. See id, at 245, 696 A.2d at 20. The justice further noted that
the reasonableness approach encouraged others to use reasonable
care to prevent even potential exposure to the virus. See id. The
court added that the lower standard assured that claims of fear of
contracting AIDS are genuine. See id The court remarked that applying the reasonableness standard was consistent with tort policy
seeking to redress harm caused by one party to another. See id,
As support for these policy considerations, the supreme court
cited several cases indicating that public policy should be considered
by the courts when deciding the issue of proximate cause-which is
ultimately an issue of law based on fairness. See id, at 245-46, 696
A.2d at 20. As such, Justice Handler concluded that reasonableness
was an appropriate standard for determining proximate cause in
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress based on a fear of
contracting AIDS. See id, at 246, 696 A.2d at 20-21.
Justice Handler next emphasized that the reasonableness standard, on its own, did not solve the problems of public policy requiring education about the risks of contracting AIDS. See id., 696 A.2d
at 21. The justice therefore suggested that the standard should incorporate a test that required a certain level of knowledge before allowing a plaintiff to recover. See id at 246-47, 696 A.2d at 21. As
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such, the court announced that the standard for allowing recovery
based on a fear of contracting AIDS was one of enhanced reasonableness. See id. at 247, 696 A.2d at 21. Under this test, the court explained, plaintiffs are required to possess a certain level of knowledge about the disease that is accurate, then-current, and generally
available to society. See id
The supreme court then reviewed the decisions of the lower
courts, and noted that the appellate division applied a reasonableness standard that did not require Williamson to prove actual exposure. See id Justice Handler criticized the standard because it relied
on common knowledge as a basis for determining whether the plaintiff's fears were reasonable. See id at 248, 696 A.2d at 21-22. The justice concluded that the reasonableness standard did not adequately
address the public policy concerns seeking to end hysteria, prejudice, and discrimination associated with AIDS because the standard
relieved plaintiffs from the burden of accessing information. See id,
696 A.2d at 22. After pointing out that the enhanced standard did
not unduly burden plaintiffs because there is sufficient public information about the disease made available by federal, state, and local governments, the court held that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendants' negligence "proximately caused her genuine and substantial emotional distress that would be experienced by a reasonable
person of ordinary experience who has a level of knowledge that coincides with then-current, accurate, and generally available public information about the causes and transmission of AIDS." Id. at 248-49,
696 A.2d at 22.
Comparing the reasoning of the lower courts, Justice Handier
recognized the trial court's holding that Williamson's emotional distress was not proximately caused by the lancet prick. See id. at 249,
696 A.2d at 22. The justice indicated that the objective test applied
by the trial court required proof of actual exposure. See id. As such,
the supreme court pointed out, the lower court found Williamson's
distress to be unreasonable as a matter of law because of the repeated negative test results for HIV. See id. The court therefore concluded that Williamson's extraordinary reaction relieved the defendants of liability because their breach was not the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's emotional injuries. See id.
The court next compared the result reached by the trial court
with that of the appellate court. See id. at 249-50, 696 A.2d at 22-23.
Justice Handler remarked that the trial court merely considered Williamson's reaction to be unreasonable as a matter of law, thereby relieving defendants of liability. See id at 249, 696 A.2d at 22. In con-
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trast, the justice stressed that the appellate court disagreed with this
result and determined that there was a period of time during which
any reasonable person would experience emotional distress after being pricked by a used medical instrument. See id. at 249-50, 696 A.2d
at 22-23. According to that analysis, the court continued, a reasonable person would cease experiencing such distress after receiving
medical consultation and subsequent negative test results. See id. at
250, 696 A.2d at 23. The court then adopted the reasoning of the
appellate court and limited the period for emotional distress damages to a "window of anxiety" beyond which a reasonable, wellinformed person would not suffer emotional distress. See id
Despite Williamson's unreasonable and continued distress after
receiving several negative test results, Justice Handler suggested that
her distress during the "window of anxiety" could be actionable. See
id. at 250-51, 696 A.2d at 23. The justice noted, however, that the
facts of this case complicated the "window of anxiety" test because
Williamson received inaccurate information from her doctor that
clearly extended her distress beyond a reasonable period of time. See
i. at 251, 696 A.2d at 23. The court therefore asserted that the issue
turned on whether the actions of the defendants were the proximate
cause of Williamson's distress that extended beyond the "window of
anxiety." See id.
The supreme court next focused on the erroneous medical information that Williamson received from Dr. DeMasi. See id. The
court stated that Williamson was misinformed that testing should
continue for seven to ten years following the incident. See id, It was
not until three years later, the majority pointed out, that Dr. DeMasi
modified his statements and informed Williamson that testing for
over a period of one or two years was sufficient. See id. Justice Handier concluded that this misinformation prolonged Williamson's fear
beyond the reasonable period of six months to one year. See id. As a
result, the justice recognized that the medical information may have
been an intervening cause of Williamson's emotional distress not
reasonably foreseen by the defendants at the time of the breach. See
id In other words, the court explained, it must be decided whether
the advice could be considered a part of the defendants' duty that,
when breached, proximately caused Williamson's emotional distress.
See id., 696 A.2d at 23-24.
In order to resolve the question involving the defendants' duty,
the supreme court commented that while there is a general duty to
avoid foreseeable harm, "'not all foreseeable risks give rise to duties.'" Id. (quoting Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Deveopers, 143 NJ. 565,
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572, 675 A.2d 209, 212 (1996)). In medical situations, the court continued, a tortfeasor is traditionally held responsible for all injuries
resulting from the initial tort. See id. at 252, 696 A.2d at 24. Considering, however, that the goal of the enhanced reasonableness standard is to promote public education about AIDS, Justice Handler
recognized that holding the defendant doctors liable for subsequent
incorrect advice from another medical professional was inconsistent
with that goal. See id. The justice also suggested that the defendants
may be protected from liability under the "learned intermediary"
rule that presumes that a medical professional who acts as an intermediary between a doctor and a patient will furnish correct information. See id. (citing Niemiera v. Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 559, 555 AK2d
1112, 1117 (1989)). The court further stressed that acknowledging
the foreseeability that a plaintiff will receive incorrect information
could actually encourage ignorance about the AIDS epidemic. See id.
at 252-53, 696 A.2d at 24.
Finally, Justice Handler decided that Dr. DeMasi's bad advice to
the plaintiff, that she be tested for seven to ten years, was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendants and therefore could not be
attributed to them. See id. at 253, 696 A.2d at 24. The justice concluded that under the enhanced reasonableness test, Williamson's
damages for emotional distress arising from her fear of contracting
AIDS did not include her prolonged distress because such distress
was attributable to Dr. DeMasi's advice. See id, As such, Justice Handler affirmed the appellate court's reversal of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and remanded the matter as modified by the
supreme court. See id., 696 A.2d at 24-25.
While the Williamson court was sensitive to plaintiff's fears of
HIV exposure, the overriding public policy concerns about ignorance and misinformation surrounding AIDS transmission forced
the court to heighten the standard of reasonableness in order to
prevent a flood of litigation. Under the enhanced reasonableness
standard, a plaintiff is required to obtain knowledge that extends beyond the common knowledge of society. That is, anyone who fears
that she may have been exposed to HIV through the negligence of
another party is required to inform herself of the most current and
accurate information before recovering damages. The difficulty of
meeting this heightened standard was evidenced by the plaintiffs
failed attempts to obtain accurate advice from her treating physician,
thus failing to satisfy the heavy burden.
As alluded to by Justice Handler, traditional doctrine would
most likely lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff acted as any rea-
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sonable person would under the circumstances and that the misinformation furnished by her physician was an intervening proximate
cause of her distress. Alternatively, the defendants may have been
shielded from liability under the "learned intermediary" doctrine.
Instead, the supreme court decided that traditional tort policy must
be modified in the particular case of emotional distress due to the
fear of contracting AIDS. This bold position clearly indicates that
the court will not tolerate frivolous or irrational fears about the disease in order to form a basis for recovery, even in situations where
there is a clear breach of a duty on the part of a defendant. As such,
the requirement to obtain up-to-date and accurate information
about the causes of AIDS transmission will effectively bar a cause of
action based on general fears about the epidemic and, in their effort
to recover damages, turn the focus of future plaintiffs to the source
of incorrect information. In light of the goal of promoting public
education about HIV and AIDS, there is little doubt that the court
will allow recovery in future cases when a defendant, especially a
medical professional, is responsible for providing inaccurate information.
Suzanne Porter

